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ON THE EXISTENCE OF EXTRACTABLE ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS∗
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Abstract. A function f is extractable if it is possible to algorithmically “extract,” from any
adversarial program that outputs a value y in the image of f , a preimage of y. When combined
with hardness properties such as one-wayness or collision-resistance, extractability has proven to be
a powerful tool. However, so far, extractability has not been explicitly shown. Instead, it has only
been considered as a nonstandard knowledge assumption on certain functions. We make headway in
the study of the existence of extractable one-way functions (EOWFs) along two directions. On the
negative side, we show that if there exist indistinguishability obfuscators for circuits, then there do not
exist EOWFs where extraction works for any adversarial program with auxiliary input of unbounded
polynomial length. On the positive side, for adversarial programs with bounded auxiliary input
(and unbounded polynomial running time), we give the first construction of EOWFs with an explicit
extraction procedure, based on relatively standard assumptions (such as subexponential hardness of
learning with errors). We then use these functions to construct the first 2-message zero-knowledge
arguments and 3-message zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge, against verifiers in the same class
of adversarial programs, from essentially the same assumptions.
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1. Introduction. The ability to argue about what adversarial programs “know”
in the context of a given interaction is central to modern cryptography. A primary
facet of such argumentation is the ability to efficiently extract knowledge from the
adversarial program. Establishing this ability is often a crucial step in security analysis
of cryptographic protocols and schemes.
Cryptographic proofs of knowledge for NP languages are an obvious example for
the use of knowledge extraction. In such proof systems, “knowledge of a witness” is
defined by way of existence of an efficient extraction procedure that given a convincing
prover for an NP statement can find a corresponding witness. The ability to extract
values from the adversary is also useful for asserting secrecy properties by simulating
the adversary’s view of an execution of a given protocol, as in the case of zero-
knowledge protocols [GMR89] or multiparty computation [GMR89, GMW87]. Other
contexts are mentioned within.
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ON THE EXISTENCE OF EXTRACTABLE ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS 1911
How is knowledge extracted. Traditionally, the basic technique for extracting
knowledge from an adversary is to run it on multiple related inputs to deduce what
it “knows” from the resulting outputs. The power of this technique (often called
“rewinding”) is in that it treats the adversary as a black-box without knowing any-
thing regarding its “internals.” However, as a number of impossibility results for
black-box reductions and simulation show, this technique is also limited. One main
limitation of rewinding-based extraction is that it requires multiple rounds of inter-
action with the adversary. For example, proving security of candidate 3-message zero-
knowledge protocols, succinct noninteractive arguments for NP languages
(SNARGs),1 and other tasks are out of the technique’s reach [GK96, GW11].
Starting with the work of Barak [Bar01], a handful of extraction techniques that go
beyond the limitations of black-box extraction have been developed. These techniques
use the actual adversarial program in an essential way, rather than only the adversary’s
input-output functionality. However, these too require several rounds of protocol
interaction, so they do not work in the above contexts.
Knowledge assumptions and extractable functions. Damg˚ard [Dam92] proposes
an alternative approach to knowledge extraction in the form of the knowledge of
exponent assumption (KEA). The assumption essentially states that it is possible
to extract the secret value x from any program that, given two random generators
g, h of an appropriate group G, outputs a pair of group elements of the form gx, hx.
This approach was then abstracted by Canetti and Dakdouk [CD08, CD09], who
formulated a notion of extractable functions. These are function families {fe} where, in
addition to standard hardness properties, such as one-wayness or collision-resistance,
any (possibly adversarial) program A that given e outputs y in the image of fe has an
“extractor” E (depending on the code of A) that given e, and any randomness used
by A, outputs a preimage of y.
Extractable functions provide an alternative (albeit nonexplicit) “extraction
method” that does not rely on interaction with the adversary. As an expression of the
method’s power, KEA [HT98, BP04a], or even general extractable one-way functions
(EWOFs) [CD09, BCC+13], are known to suffice for constructing 3-message zero-
knowledge (ZK) protocols, and extractable collision-resistant hash functions (ECRHs)
are known to suffice for constructing succinct noninteractive arguments [BCCT12].
KEA had also led to relatively efficient constructions of encryption schemes with
strong security guarantees (such as resilience to chosen cipertext attacks) [Dam92,
BP04a].
The black-box impossibility of some of the above applications implies that it is
impossible to obtain extractable functions where the extractor uses the adversary’s
program A only as a black-box. Coming up with suitable non-black-box techniques
has been the main obstacle in constructing extractable functions, and prior to this
work, no construction with an explicit extraction procedure was known. Instead,
for all existing candidate constructions of extractable functions (e.g., [Dam92, CD09,
BCCT12, BC12]), the existence of such an extractor is merely assumed. Such as-
sumptions are arguably not satisfying. For one, they do not qualify as “efficiently
falsifiable” [Nao03]; that is, unlike standard assumptions, here it may not be pos-
sible to algorithmically test whether a given adversary breaks the assumption. In
1Roughly speaking, these are 2-message computationally sound proof systems, where verification
can be done much faster than traditional NP verification. Such proof systems have drawn a lot
of attention in recent years due to the powerful solution they suggest to the problem of verifiably
delegating computation.
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1912 N. BITANSKY, R. CANETTI, O. PANETH, AND A. ROSEN
addition, the impossibility of extractable functions with black-box extraction only
further decreases our confidence in such assumptions, as our current understanding
of non-black-box techniques and their limitations is quite limited.
Thus, a natural question arises:
Can we construct extractable functions from standard hardness as-
sumptions?
Alternatively, can we show that extractable functions cannot exist?
On the role of auxiliary input. It turns out that the question is more nuanced.
Specifically, we show that the answer crucially depends on how we model the “auxiliary
information” available to the evaluator A and the extractor E . Let us elaborate. One
straightforward formulation of extractable functions requires that for any possible
adversary (modeled as a uniform polynomial-time algorithm) there exists an extractor
(again, modeled as a uniform polynomial-time algorithm) that successfully extracts as
described above given the adversary’s coin tosses. An alternative is to model both the
adversary and the extractor as nonuniform families of deterministic polynomial-size
circuits.
However, it turns out that in many applications neither formulation suffices. In-
deed, when using extractable functions with other components in a larger crypto-
graphic scheme or protocol, an adversary A may gather information z from other
components and use it as additional auxiliary input when evaluating the extractable
function. To be useful in these cases, the extractor needs to be able to deal with
auxiliary information that is determined after the extractor has been fixed. That is,
we require that for any adversary A there exists an extractor E such that for any
polynomial-size auxiliary input z, and for a randomly chosen key e, whenever A(z, e)
outputs an image y, E(z, e) output a corresponding preimage of y.2 In the above, we
can model both the adversary A and the extractor E either as a uniform polynomial-
time algorithm or as nonuniform algorithms with polynomial-size advice. We call z
the common auxiliary input, and if A and E are nonuniform we refer to their advice
as individual auxiliary input.
We note that the concept of common auxiliary input appears elsewhere in cryp-
tography. For instance, to make sure that ZK protocols remain ZK under sequential
composition, the verifier and simulator get common auxiliary input [Gol93, GO94].
To obtain this standard formulation of ZK using extractable functions, extractability
with common auxiliary input is needed. In other settings, the definition can be re-
laxed to consider only the case where the common auxiliary input is taken from some
specific distribution that captures the “possible” auxiliary information in a given sys-
tem. For example, Goldreich [Gol93] considers the case that the auxiliary input is
generated by a uniform polynomial-time algorithm. Another more specific example
is in [BCCT12], where they consider a distribution of auxiliary inputs consisting of
“randomized encryptions of random messages.”
1.1. Overview of results. We give two quite different answers to the above
question. On the negative side, following the common belief (first expressed in
[HT98]), we give formal evidence that EWOFs with common auxiliary input of un-
bounded length may not exist. Specifically, we show that such extractable functions
cannot exist assuming a notion of program obfuscation called indistinguishability ob-
fuscation (IO) [BGI+01].3
2Above we avoid explicitly referring to the adversary’s coin tosses. Any such coins will be
considered as part of the auxiliary input z.
3We further elaborate on the notion of IO later in this introduction.
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ON THE EXISTENCE OF EXTRACTABLE ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS 1913
Theorem 1 (informal). If there exist indistinguishability obfuscators for circuits,
then there do not exist EWOFs with respect to common auxiliary input of unbounded
polynomial length.
This seems to suggest that the concept of EWOFs (and other concepts that imply
it, such as extractable collision-resistant hashing or SNARGs) may be shaky overall.
Indeed, the notion of IO is not known to be subject to any lower bounds or limitations,
and starting from the work of [GGH+13b], several candidate constructions of IO have
been exhibited (so far, based on strong assumptions).
On the positive side, we show, for the first time, how to construct extractable one-
way functions with an explicit extraction procedure with respect to auxiliary input of
bounded polynomial length (common or individual) and, in particular, with respect to
uniform adversaries. More specifically, we first give a construction of extractable one-
way functions based on verifiable delegation schemes for deterministic computations,
which we will call publicly verifiable delegation schemes.4
Theorem 2 (informal). Assuming one-way functions and publicly verifiable
delegation schemes, there exist EOWFs with respect to auxiliary input of bounded
polynomial length (common or individual).
The existence of publicly verifiable delegation schemes is perhaps not considered
a standard assumption, but it is a falsifiable assumption (in the sense of [Nao03],
which we described above).5 Furthermore it has candidates such as Micali’s CS
proofs [Mic00], SNARGs [BCCT13], or constructions based on IO [BGL+15, CHJV15,
KLW15]. We view this construction mainly as a proof of concept, showing that ruling
out such extractable functions may be a hard task.
Aiming toward a construction from standard assumptions, we formulate a gener-
alized variant of EWOFs (GEOWFs), capturing the properties which make EOWFs
useful, and indeed construct bounded-auxiliary-input GEOWFs from relatively stan-
dard assumptions. Specifically, our construction relies on the existence of privately
verifiable delegation schemes, first established by [KRR14], based, for instance, on the
learning with errors assumption. We additionally show that the limitation given by
Theorem 1 also holds for GEOWFs.
Relying on GEOWFs, we give the first constructions from standard assumptions of
2-message ZK arguments and 3-message ZK arguments of knowledge, against verifiers
with bounded auxiliary input.6
Theorem 3 (informal).
1. Assuming (even privately verifiable) delegation schemes, there exist GEOWFs
with respect to auxiliary input of bounded polynomial length (common or in-
dividual).
2. Assuming GEOWFs, ZAPs [DN07], and (1-hop [GHV10]) homomorphic en-
cryption, there exists a 3-message ZK argument of knowledge against bounded-
auxiliary-input verifiers. Assuming the GEOWFs are one-way against subex-
ponential-time adversaries, there exists a 2-message zero-knowledge argument
against bounded-auxiliary-input verifiers.
We next elaborate on each of the results.
4Below we describe this notion more elaborately.
5See the discussion in [CLP13] on the equivalent concept of 2-message P-certificates.
6By arguments we mean computationally sound [BCC88].
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1914 N. BITANSKY, R. CANETTI, O. PANETH, AND A. ROSEN
1.2. Impossibility with respect to unbounded auxiliary input. To in-
troduce the negative result regarding EOWFs with unbounded (common) auxiliary
input, we first elaborate on the concept of obfuscation and explain its contrast with
auxiliary-input extractability.
Obfuscation. Program obfuscation is aimed at making code unintelligible while
preserving its functionality and has been long considered the holy grail of cryptog-
raphy, with diverse and far-reaching applications. Barak et al. [BGI+01] initiated
the rigorous treatment of obfuscation, formulating a number of definitions of security
for the task. However, until recently, we only knew how to obfuscate a number of
restricted classes of programs under any of these definitions. Furthermore, Barak et
al. demonstrated a class of programs that are unobfuscatable according the natural
virtual black-box (VBB) definition, guaranteeing that access to the obfuscated pro-
gram gives no more power than access to an impenetrable black box with the same
input-output functionality.
This state of affairs changed with the work by Garg et al. [GGH+13b], who
proposed a candidate construction of general-purpose obfuscators. They show that
under strong assumptions on multilinear maps [GGH13a], their construction satisfies
the relaxed notion of IO [BGI+01], for which no impossibility results are known. The
IO notion only requires that it is hard to distinguish an obfuscation of C0 from an
obfuscation of C1 for any two circuits C0 and C1 of the same size that compute the
exact same function.
The tension between obfuscation and extractable functions. As noted already in
the work of Hada and Tanaka [HT98], extractability with respect to common auxiliary
input is a strong requirement. Indeed, the common auxiliary input z may potentially
encode an arbitrary circuit to be executed by the adversary in order to produce
an image y. The extractor should, thus, be able to efficiently “reverse engineer”
such a circuit, in order to figure out a preimage of y. This reveals a clear tension
with obfuscation: if z contains obfuscated code that chooses a preimage in some
complicated way, it may be impossible to extract from.
The question is how to turn this intuition into a formal impossibility. While VBB
obfuscation may be the natural choice, we do not have any evidence that there exist
VBB obfuscators for a complicated task such as the one described above (in fact,
there is evidence that they do not [GK05, BCC+14]). We show that IO suffices to
make this intuition rigorous.
Proof idea. We focus on the “hardest scenario,” where the auxiliary input z may
represent an arbitrary malicious and potentially obfuscated code. Specifically, we
consider the following folklore case (sketched in [BCCT12]), where z is an obfuscation
of a circuit Ck that, given key e for an extractable function fe, chooses its preimage
in an unpredictable way: it applies PRFk, a pseudorandom function [GGM86], to the
key and outputs the result fe(PRFk(e)).
An adversary, given such an obfuscated circuit as auxiliary input z, can run it
on the key e for the extractable function and always obtain a proper image. The
question is whether the extractor, given the same (e, z), can output a preimage. In-
tuitively, had we given the extractor black box access to the circuit Ck, instead of
an obfuscation of Ck, it would have to invert the one-way function to obtain such
a preimage. Indeed, since the oracle Ck answers any query e
′ with fe′(PRFk(e′)), it
follows from pseudorandomness that finding a preimage of fe(PRFk(e)) is as hard as
finding a preimage of fe(u) for a uniformly random u.
Can the above intuition be translated to a proof using IO? Indeed, when z is
an IO obfuscation iO(Ck) of the circuit Ck, it is not clear what kind of information
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ON THE EXISTENCE OF EXTRACTABLE ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS 1915
leaks on the PRF key k. Nevertheless, we show that the above intuition can still
be fulfilled. The idea is to consider an alternative to the circuit Ck that computes
the same function, but without actually “knowing” the preimage PRFk(e). This is
achieved using the puncturing technique of Sahai and Waters [SW14].
Specifically, instead of using any PRF family, we use a puncturable PRF. In
such PRFs it is possible to puncture a given key k at an arbitrary point x∗ in the
domain of the function. The punctured function PRFkx∗ , with punctured key kx∗ ,
preserves functionality at any other point, but hides any information on the point
PRFk(x
∗); namely, the value PRFk(x∗) is pseudorandom, even given (x∗, kx∗). As
shown in several works [BW13, BGI14, KPTZ13], such puncturable PRFs follow from
the GGM construction [GGM86].
Using a puncturable PRF in the implementation of Ck, we can now show that
if the extractor succeeds in finding a preimage of y = fe(PRFk(e)), it would also
succeed had we provided it with an obfuscation of an alternative circuit Cke,y. The
circuit Cke,y computes the same function as Ck, but in a different way: it only has
the punctured key ke and has the value y = fe(PRFk(e)) directly hardwired into it,
so that it does not have to evaluate the PRF in order to compute it. Thus, the fact
that the extractor still succeeds follows by the guarantee of IO. However, now by
the pseudorandomness guarantee at the punctured point e, we know that PRFk(e) is
pseudorandom, even given the circuit Cke,y, and thus the extractor can be used to
invert the one-way function fe from scratch.
Finally, we note that since puncturable PRFs can be constructed from one-way
functions, and any EOWF is in particular a one-way function, it follows that the
impossibility of EOWFs is implied by IO without any further assumptions. We also
note that the result naturally extends to the notion of generalized EOWFs (presented
in more detail in the following subsection).
So, is the KEA wrong?. In its original formulation [Dam92] and in subsequent
formulations [HT98, BP04a, BP04b], the KEA was not stated with respect to common
auxiliary input but rather only for individual auxiliary input (or completely uniform
algorithms), where any A with advice zA has an extractor E with its own advice zE ,
and the only common extra information is the adversary’s coin tosses and key for
the function. In particular, given a nonuniform adversary A with an obfuscated code
as advice zA, the extractor is allowed to have a different advice zE , representing the
“deobfuscated” code. Indeed, our result does not rule out such a notion of extraction
(even assuming IO for all circuits).
Our result does not invalidate the intuition that “the only way” to compute
(gx, hx), given (g, h), is by “knowing” x. As we saw, our adversary and auxiliary
input are devised so that x is actually known, but only by an underlying obfuscated
computation, and thus cannot be figured out efficiently by an external extractor.
We also note that our result does not rule out extractable functions with re-
spect to common auxiliary input that is taken from specific distributions that may be
conjectured to be “benign.”
Subsequent work. The negative result presented above, in fact, shows that for any
candidate EOWF family F , there exists a distribution ZF , and an adversary A, such
that any extractor E for A would fail with respect to common auxiliary input sampled
from ZF . As noted by Boyle and Pass [BP15], our result can be generalized so that
Z does not depend on F but only on some upper bound TF on its running time
(by having Z encode a proper universal circuit). Boyle and Pass further show that,
assuming a strengthening of IO called extractable obfuscation (also known as differing
inputs obfuscation), Z can be made independent of TF and only depend on its output
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1916 N. BITANSKY, R. CANETTI, O. PANETH, AND A. ROSEN
length `F ; in particular, elements sampled from Z can be longer than `F . We note
that their result does not clash with our positive result for bounded auxiliary input,
in which `F is made longer than the bound on auxiliary inputs. We also note that
both our and Boyle and Pass’s impossibility apply for a specific and rather contrived
distribution. No impossibility is yet known for distributions that may be considered
“benign,” such as the uniform distribution.
1.3. Constructions with respect to bounded auxiliary input. We first
formulate GEOWFs and show how GEOWFs can be constructed from standard as-
sumptions. Then, we shall see that under appropriate conditions, we can leverage the
same ideas in order to get standard EOWFs.
Generalized EOWFs. The essence of EOWFs, and what makes them useful, is the
asymmetry between a black-box inverter and a non-black-box extractor: an inverter,
which only gets a random image y = fe(x) of an EOWF, cannot find a corresponding
preimage x′, whereas a non-black-box extractor, which is given a code that produces
such an image, can find a preimage x′. GEOWFs allow us to express this asymmetry
in a more flexible way. Concretely, a function family F is now associated with a
“hard” binary relation RFe on image-witness pairs (fe(x), x′). Given y = fe(x) for a
random x, it is infeasible to find a witness x′ such that RFe (y, x′) = 1. In contrast,
a non-black-box extractor that is given a code that produces such an image can find
such a witness x′.
It is natural to require that the relation RFe is efficiently testable; in this case we
say that the GEOWF is publicly verifiable. However, we shall see that GEOWFs are
useful, even for hard relations that are not publicly verifiable. Specifically, we will
consider privately verifiable GEOWFs where RFe (y, x′) is not efficiently testable given
only (y = fe(x), x
′) but can be efficiently tested given x in addition.
The main idea behind the construction. To convey the basic idea behind our con-
structions of GEOWFs with respect to bounded auxiliary input, consider the following
first attempt. The GEOWF f is keyless; it is simply a pseudorandom generator (PRG)
stretching inputs of length n to outputs of length 2n. The relation RF contains pairs
(y,M) such that the witnessM is a description of a machine of length at most n and
M(1n) outputs y. The fact that the relation RF (y, ·) is hard to satisfy for y = f(x)
and a random x follows from the pseudorandomness of the output y. Indeed, a truly
random output that is indistinguishable from y would have high Kolmogorov complex-
ity. However, given any adversarial program MA whose description size is bounded
by n and that outputs some y ∈ {0, 1}2n, the description of the programMA itself is
a witness that satisfies the relation RF (y,MA), and thus extraction is trivial.
The main problem with the above is that the time required to test the relationRF
(even given some preimage of y) is not bounded by any particular polynomial; indeed,
the running time of MA may be an arbitrary polynomial. One can try to fix this by
padding the witness MA with 1t, where t is the running time of MA. However, now
the length of the extracted witness depends on the running time of the adversarial
program MA and is not bounded by any particular polynomial in the length of the
image. Such generalized extractable functions do not seem to be as powerful, though;
in particular, we do not know how to use them in applications such as 2-message and
3-message ZK protocols.
A similar problem is encountered in Barak’s ZK protocol [Bar01], where the en-
tire computation of a malicious verifier is used as a “trapdoor” in the ZK simulation
procedure. Inspired by the ZK protocol of Barak, Lindell, and Vadhan [BLV06], we
get around this problem using a non-interactive proof system that allows for quick
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ON THE EXISTENCE OF EXTRACTABLE ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS 1917
verification of (possibly long) computations. Instead of computing the output y of
the witness program MA, RF will (quickly) verify a proof for the fact that MA(1n)
outputs y. That is, (y, (M, pi)) ∈ RF only if pi is a convincing proof thatM(1n) = y.
Intuitively, the soundness of the proof guarantees that the relation is still hard to sat-
isfy. Extraction from a bounded-auxiliary-input adversaryMA is done by computing
a proof for its computation.
Delegation schemes. The proof system required in our constructions is a non-
interactive computationally sound proof for deterministic statements, from here on
referred to simply as a delegation scheme. More precisely, in a delegation scheme,
the verifier generates, once and for all, an “oﬄine message” σ together with a private
verification state τ , and sends σ to the prover. Then, the prover can compute a
noninteractive proof pi for any adaptively chosen statement of the sort: “machine
M outputs v within t steps.” We require that the verifier runs in time polynomial
in the security parameter n, but only polylogarithmic in t, and the prover runs in
time polynomial in (t, n). We say that a delegation scheme is publicly verifiable if the
verification state τ can be published without compromising soundness. Otherwise we
say that the scheme is privately verifiable.
As mentioned in section 1.1, while we do have candidates for publicly verifiable
delegation schemes, their security is not based on standard assumptions. In a re-
cent breakthrough result, Kalai, Raz, and Rothblum [KRR14] construct a privately
verifiable delegation scheme based on any private information retrieval scheme with
subexponential security. The scheme of [KRR14] has two deficiencies that we need to
deal with. First, it only has nonadaptive soundness, and second they require that a
bound on the running time t of proven computations is provided at setup time when
(τ, σ) are generated. To overcome the first problem, we show that relying on complex-
ity leveraging soundness can be enhanced for statements that are adaptively chosen
from a relatively small set of possible statements, which will suffice for our purposes.
We show that the second problem can be easily solved as long as t is exponentially
bounded in the security parameter. In the body of the paper, we call such delegation
schemes universal (in the spirit of [BG08]) to capture the fact that a single system
accounts for computations of a priori unbounded polynomial time.
GEOWFs from delegation schemes. We now sketch how delegation schemes are
used in our constructions. We obtain publicly verifiable (respectively, privately verifi-
able) GEOWFs based on publicly verifiable (respectively, privately verifiable) delega-
tion schemes. In both cases, the GEOWF f is keyless, it is given as input a seed
s and a random string r. f applies a PRG on s and obtains an image v. f then
uses the randomness r to sample an oﬄine message σ together with a verification
state τ for a delegation scheme. Finally, f outputs (v, σ). We assume that if the
delegation scheme is publicly verifiable, the oﬄine message σ includes the verification
state τ . Also, if the delegation scheme is privately verifiable, we assume that τ can
be (perhaps inefficiently) determined from σ. (Both assumptions are without loss of
generality (w.l.o.g).)
The relation RF contains pairs consisting of an image (v, σ) and witness (M, pi),
such that the length ofM is much shorter than the length of v, and pi is an accepting
proof for the statement “M(1n) outputs v,” with respect to the verification state τ
corresponding to the oﬄine message σ. Indeed, if the delegation scheme is publicly
verifiable, τ can be efficiently computed from σ, and therefore the relation RF is
efficiently testable. And if the delegation scheme is privately verifiable, τ can be
efficiently computed given a primage of (v, σ) that contains the randomness used to
sample σ and τ .
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Constructing standard EOWFs. We show how to construct a standard (not gener-
alized) EOWF g from a publicly verifiable GEOWF f . The basic high-level idea is to
embed the structure of the GEOWF f and the relation RF into the standard EOWF
g. For this purpose, g will get as input a string i ∈ {0, 1}n, which intuitively picks one
of two branches for computing the function. If i 6= 0n, which is almost always the case
for a random input, the output is computed in the “normal branch,” where g takes
an input x for the GEOWF f and outputs f(x). If i = 0n, the output is computed in
the “trapdoor branch,” which is almost never taken for a random input but is used
by the extractor. In the trapdoor branch, g takes as input a candidate output y for
f and a witness x′ for RF (y, ·). g verifies that (y, x′) ∈ RF and if so, it outputs y.
Given an adversarial program MA that outputs y in the image of f , the extractor
for g can invoke the extractor for f , obtain a witness x′ such that (y, x′) ∈ RF , and
from this witness construct a valid (trapdoor branch) primage (i = 0n, y, x′) for y.
The above transformation cannot start from a privately verifiable GEOWF; in-
deed public verification is required to allow the function to efficiently evaluate the
relation RF in the trapdoor branch. We also note that the above transformation is
oversimplified and implicitly assumes that an adversarial evaluator cannot use the
trapdoor branch of the function to produce an output that is in the image of g but
not in the image of f , in which case extraction may fail. In the paper we show how
to avoid this problem by relying on the specific construction of publicly verifiable
GEOWFs from publicly verifiable delegation schemes that possess an extra property
(satisfied by existing candidates).
1.4. Zero knowledge against verifiers with bounded auxiliary input.
We start by describing how to construct 2-message and 3-message ZK protocols from
standard (nongeneralized) EOWFs, and then explain how to replace the EOWFs with
GEOWFs.
From EOWFs to 3-message ZK. The protocol follows a common methodology
for designing ZK protocols known as the Feige–Lapidot–Shamir trapdoor paradigm
[FLS99]. Given, say a keyless, EOWF f , the basic idea is to have the verifier send
the prover an image y = f(x) of a random element x, which will serve as the trap-
door. The prover would then give a witness-indistinguishable (WI) proof of knowledge
(WIPOK) attesting that it either knows a witness w for the proven statement or knows
a preimage x′ of y. Intuitively, soundness (and actually proof of knowledge) follow
from the one-wayness of f and the proof of knowledge property of the WI system.
Zero knowledge follows from the extractability of f . Indeed, the simulator, given the
code of the verifier, can run the extractor of the EOWF, obtain x, and use it in the
WI proof.
Following through on this intuition encounters several difficulties. First, a WIPOK
requires three messages, and thus a first WI prover message must be sent in the first
message of the protocol. Furthermore, the WI statement is determined only when
the verifier sends y in the second protocol message. Therefore, we must make sure to
use a WIPOK where the first prover message does not depend on the statement. An-
other basic problem concerns the length of the first WI message. Recall that, in our
construction of EOWFs against bounded auxiliary input adversaries, the function’s
output is longer than the adversary’s advice. Since a cheating verifier may compute
y using the first WI message as advice, we must use a WI system where the length
of the first message is independent of the length of the proven statement. We design
a WI argument with the required properties based on two standard cryptographic
primitives: ZAPs [DN07] and extractable commitments [PW09].
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An additional potential problem is that a malicious verifier may output an element
y˜ outside of the function’s image, an event which in general may not be efficiently
recognizable, and cause the simulator to fail. This can be solved in a couple of generic
ways; below we outline one such solution, based on 1-hop homomorphic encryption.
A different approach to the problem, based on ZAPs, is described in [BCC+13].
From EOWFs to 2-message ZK. In the 2-message protocol, we replace the 3-
message WIPOK with a 2-message WI proof (e.g., a ZAP). However, in the above
3-message protocol, soundness is established by using the POK property of the WI,
whereas 2-message WI proofs of knowledge are not known. Instead, relying on ideas
similar to those used in [BLV06], we prove soundness using complexity leveraging.
The prover adds to its message a statistically binding commitment to an arbitrary
message and proves that either “x ∈ L” or “f(x) = y and the commitment opens to
x.” We require that the commitment is invertible in some superpolynomial time T ,
whereas the one-wayness of f still holds against adversaries that run in time poly(T ).
Now, an inverter of f can run the cheating prover with a verifier message that contains
its input image y and brute-force break the commitment to obtain a preimage of y.
Replacing EOWF with GEOWF. We would like to base our ZK protocols on
privately verifiable GEOWFs (which can be constructed from standard assumptions)
instead of on EOWFs. A natural first attempt is to modify the protocol as follows:
the verifier sends an image y = f(x), as before, and the prover then gives a WIPOK
attesting either that it knows a witness w for the proven statement or that it knows
not a preimage but a witness x′ such that RF (y, x′) = 1. The main problem with this
first attempt is that the relation RF is not publicly verifiable, and thus the simulator
has no way of proving the statement. Another possible problem is that a malicious
verifier may output an element outside of the function’s image, an event which in
general may not be efficiently recognizable. In such a case there is no extraction
guarantee, and simulation may fail.
The solution for both problems is to test the relation RF , and the validity of
the verifier’s image, using a 2-message secure function evaluation protocol, based,
for example, on a 1-hop homomorphic encryption [GHV10]. More concretely, the
verifier, in addition to the function’s output y, sends an encryption c of the input
x. The simulator then homomorphically evaluates a circuit that efficiently computes
RF (y, x′) given x, as well as verifies that indeed y = f(x). The simulator then obtains
an evaluated ciphertext cˆ that decrypts to 1 (the honest prover will simply simulate
an encryption cˆ of 1). Finally, the prover (or simulator) sends back cˆ and gives a
WIPOK attesting either that it knows a witness w for the proven statement or that
the ciphertext cˆ was generated as described. The verifier verifies the WI proof is
accepting and that cˆ decrypts to 1.
Limitations on 2- and 3-message ZK and related work. Three-message ZK pro-
tocols with black-box simulation exist only for trivial languages [GK96]. The impos-
sibility extends to the case of adversaries with bounded advice of size nΩ(1), where
n is the security parameter (see Appendix A for more details). Previous 3-message
ZK protocols were based either on the KEA [HT98, BP04a], on EOWF [BCC+13],
or on other extractability assumptions [CD08]. In all, the simulator uses a nonblack
extractor that is only assumed to exist but not explicitly constructed.
2-message ZK arguments against adversaries with unbounded polynomial advice
exist only for trivial languages (regardless of how simulation is done) [GO94]. In fact,
this impossibility extends even to adversaries with bounded advice, provided that
the advice string is longer than the verifier’s message. Barak, Lindell, and Vadhan
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[BLV06] construct a 2-message argument that is ZK as long as the verifier’s advice is
shorter than the verifier message by a superlogarithmic additive factor. Indeed, our
2-message protocol has the same skeleton. However, security of the Barak–Lindell–
Vadhan protocol is only shown assuming existence of delegation schemes (or, in fact,
universal arguments for nondeterministic languages) that are publicly verifiable, which
as discussed earlier is not considered to be a standard assumption.
1.5. Open questions. This work leaves open several questions regarding the
existence of extractable function. We next highlight some of these questions that we
find mostly intriguing:
1. There is a gap between the positive and negative results in terms of the type
and length of auxiliary input. Specifically, we do not know if there exist
EOWFs with respect to individual auxiliary input of unbounded polynomial
length and no common auxiliary input (or common auxiliary input of bounded
polynomial length).
2. Another question regards the existence of extractable functions (even with
respect to completely uniform adversaries) that satisfy stronger one-wayness
properties. Particularly interesting is the possibility of extractable functions
where the adversary’s output computationally binds it to a specific input, for
example, ECRHs and extractable injective one-way functions.
3. Finally, we ask whether there exist EOWFs with respect to common auxiliary
input that is taken from specific “benign” distribution, such as the uniform
distribution.
Organization. In section 2, we recall basic conventions and notation. In sec-
tion 3, we give the relevant definitions for EOWF and GEOWF. In section 4, we
present the limitation on unbounded auxiliary-input EOWFs based on IO. In section 5,
we present the constructions of bounded-auxiliary-input EOWFs and GEOWFs. In
section 6.4, we present the ZK protocols constructed from GEOWFs. In Appendix
A, we discuss relevant black-box lower bounds for EOWFs and ZK.
2. Preliminaries.
Standard computational concepts and conventions. We recall the standard notions
that we rely on.
• We say that a (uniform) Turing machine is PPT if it is probabilistic and
runs in polynomial time. A polynomial-size circuit family C is a sequence of
circuits C = {Cn}n∈N such that each circuit Cn is of polynomial size nO(1)
and has nO(1) inputs and outputs bits.
• We follow the standard habit of modeling any efficient adversary as a family
of polynomial-size circuits. For an adversary A corresponding to a family of
polynomial-size circuits {An}n∈N we often omit the subscript n when it is
clear from the context.
• We say that a function ν(·) is negligible if it decays faster than any inverse
polynomial in n. We may also denote this by ν(n) = n−ω(1). Following
common practice, we denote by negl(n) any nonspecific negligible function
(typically these functions will describe the success probability of an adversary
in a specific security definition and are allowed to depend on the adversary
in question).
• For an infinite index set I, we say that two distribution ensembles X =
{Xi}i∈I and Y = {Yi}i∈I are computationally indistinguishable and denote
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ON THE EXISTENCE OF EXTRACTABLE ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS 1921
this by X ≈c Y if for any polynomial-size distinguisher D = {Dn}n∈N, any
n ∈ N and i ∈ I ∩ {0, 1}n,
|Pr [Dn(Xi) = 1]− Pr [Dn(Yi) = 1]| ≤ negl(n) .
• We denote by Un the uniform distribution on strings in {0, 1}n.
Proof systems and arguments. We consider (possibly interactive) proof systems
between a prover P and a PPT verifier V . We denote the output of the verifier by
〈P (a), V (b)〉(c), where the parties have individual inputs a and b (respectively) and
common input c.
For a relationRL corresponding to a language L={ϕ | ∃w such that (ϕ,w) ∈ RL},
we say that (P, V ) is a proof system for R (or L) if is satisfies the following:
1. Completeness: For any ϕ ∈ L ∩ {0, 1}n,
Pr [〈P, V 〉(ϕ) = 1] = 1 .
2. Soundness: For any malicious P ∗ and ϕ ∈ {0, 1}n \ L,
Pr [〈P ∗, V 〉(ϕ) = 1] ≤ negl(n) .
We say that a system is an argument if soundness is guaranteed only against polynomial-
size P ∗ = {P ∗n}n∈N.
3. Extractable one-way functions. In this section, we define auxiliary-input
EOWFs, bounded-auxiliary-input EOWFs, and GEOWFs.
Definition 4 (auxiliary-input EOWFs [CD08]). Let `, `′,m be polynomially
bounded length functions. An efficiently computable family of functions
F =
{
fe : {0, 1}`(n) → {0, 1}`′(n)
∣∣∣ e ∈ {0, 1}m(n), n ∈ N} ,
associated with an efficient (probabilistic) key sampler KF , is an auxiliary-input
EOWF if it is as follows:
1. One-way: For any polynomial-size A = {An}n∈N and n ∈ N,
Pr
e←KF (1n)
x←{0,1}`(n)
[
x′ ← A(e, fe(x))
fe(x
′) = fe(x)
]
≤ negl(n) .
2. Extractable: For any PPT adversary A, there exists a PPT extractor E such
that, for any polynomial b, security parameter n ∈ N, and z ∈ {0, 1}b(n),
Pr
e←KF (1n)
[ ∃x : fe(x) = y
fe(x
′) 6= y
∣∣∣∣ y ← A(e; z)x′ ← E(e; z)
]
≤ negl(n) .
Bounded auxiliary input. We now define bounded-auxiliary-input EOWFs. Un-
like the definition above, where extraction is guaranteed with respect to auxiliary
input of any polynomial size b, here b is fixed in advance and the function is designed
accordingly. That is, extraction is guaranteed only against adversaries whose advice
is bounded by b, whereas their running time may still be an arbitrary polynomial;
this, in particular, captures the class of uniform polynomial-time adversaries.
For b-bounded auxiliary input, we also define keyless families. While for un-
bounded auxiliary input, extraction is impossible for keyless families (the adversary
may get as auxiliary input a random image, thus forcing the extractor to break one-
wayness), for b-bounded auxiliary input, it may be possible, since the output length
`′ can be larger than the bound b on the auxiliary input. Our constructions will yield
such keyless functions.
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Definition 5 (b-bounded-auxiliary-input EOWFs). Let b, `, `′,m be polynomi-
ally bounded length functions (where `, `′,m may depend on b). An efficiently com-
putable family of functions
F =
{
fe : {0, 1}`(n) → {0, 1}`′(n)
∣∣∣ e ∈ {0, 1}m(n), n ∈ N} ,
associated with an efficient (probabilistic) key sampler KF , is a b-bounded auxiliary-
input EOWF if it is as follow:
1. One-way: As in Definition 4.
2. Extractable against b-bounded adversaries: For any PPT adversary A, there
exists a PPT extractor E such that for any security parameter n ∈ N, and
z ∈ {0, 1}b(n),
Pr
e←KF (1n)
[ ∃x : fe(x) = y
fe(x
′) 6= y
∣∣∣∣ y ← A(e; z)x′ ← E(e; z)
]
≤ negl(n) .
We say that the function is keyless if in all the above definitions the key is always set
to be the security parameter, namely, e ≡ 1n. In this case, the extraction guarantee
always holds (rather than only for a random key).
Remark 1 (bounded randomness). Throughout, we treat any randomness used
by the adversary as part of its advice z; in particular, in the case of bounded advice,
we assume that the randomness is bounded accordingly. For many applications, this
is sufficient as we can transform any adversary that uses arbitrary polynomial ran-
domness to one that uses bounded randomness, by having it stretch its randomness
with a PRG. This approach is applicable, for example, for ZK protocols against b-
bounded auxiliary-input verifiers (see section 6), as well as for any application where
testing if the adversary breaks the scheme can be done efficiently.
Remark 2 (other forms of auxiliary input).
1. Individual versus common auxiliary input. In the above formulation of ex-
tractability, the adversary A (producing an image) and the extractor E are
modeled as uniform PPT machines that obtain the same common auxiliary
input z. This formulation is aligned with the treatment of auxiliary input in
other settings such as ZK or obfuscation and, as explained in the introduc-
tion, is instrumental when arguing about extractable functions in the context
of a larger system.
As also mentioned in the introduction, in certain contexts it may be sufficient
to consider individual auxiliary input, where we only require that for any A
with auxiliary input zA, there exists an extractor E with auxiliary input zE .
The extractor’s zE may arbitrarily and inefficiently depend on zA and could
be of an arbitrary polynomial size. This weaker notion may be useful in cases
where the adversary’s auxiliary inputs do not depend on computations that
may have taken place in the system before the extractable function is used.
Examples include constructions of encryption schemes with strong security
guarantees (resilience to chosen ciphertext attacks and plaintext awareness)
based on nonuniform security reductions [Dam92, BP04b]. (We may also
consider a definition that allows both individual and common auxiliary input.)
2. Common but “benign” auxiliary input. In the above formulation, it is re-
quired that extraction works for a worst-case choice of the common auxiliary
input z. In certain contexts, however, it is sufficient to consider a definition
where the common auxiliary input z is drawn from a specific distribution
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that is conjectured to be “benign,” in the sense that it is unlikely to encode a
malicious obfuscation. For instance, the distribution can be uniform or an en-
cryption of a random string. Examples where this is sufficient include many of
the works on SNARGs, succinct noninteractive ZK, and targeted malleability
that rely on extractable primitives [DCL08, Mie08, Gro10, GLR11, BSW12,
BCCT12, BC12, DFH12, Lip12, BCCT13, BCI+13, GGPR13, Lip13].
3.1. Generalized extractable one-way functions. The essence of EOWFs,
and what makes them useful is the asymmetry between an inverter and a non-black-
box extractor: a black-box inverter that gets only a random image y = fe(x) cannot
find a corresponding preimage x′, whereas a non-black-box extractor, which is given
a code that produces such an image (including any randomness it uses), can find a
preimage x′. GEOWFs allow us to express this asymmetry in a more flexible way.
Concretely, a function family F is now associated with a “hard” relationRFe (fe(x), x′)
on image-witness pairs (fe(x), x
′) ∈ {0, 1}`′ × {0, 1}`. Given y = fe(x) for a random
x, it is infeasible to find a witness x′ such that RFe (y, x′) = 1. In contrast, a non-
black-box extractor that is given a code that produces such an image can find such a
witness x′.
We consider two variants of GEOWFs. The first is publicly verifiable GEOWFs,
where for (y = fe(x), x
′) the relation RFe (y, x′) can be efficiently tested given y and x′
only (and the key e). The second is privately verifiable GEOWFs, where the relation
RFe (y, x′) might not be efficiently testable given only (y = fe(x), x′), but it is possible
to efficiently test the relation given x in addition.
We note that standard EOWFs, as given in Definition 4, fall under the category
of publicly verifiable GEOWFs, where the relation RFe (y, x) simply tests whether
y = fe(x).
Definition 6 (GEOWFs). An efficiently computable family of functions
F =
{
fe : {0, 1}`(n) → {0, 1}`′(n)
∣∣∣ e ∈ {0, 1}m(n), n ∈ N} ,
associated with an efficient (probabilistic) key sampler KF , is a GEOWF, with respect
to a relation RFe (y, x) on triples (e, y, x) ∈ {0, 1}m(n)+`
′(n)+`(n), if it is as follows:
1. RF -Hard: For any polynomial-size A = {An}n∈N and security parameter
n ∈ N,
Pr
e←KF (1n)
x←{0,1}`(n)
[
x′ ← A(e, fe(x))
RFe (fe(x), x′) = 1
]
≤ negl(n) .
2. RF -Extractable: For any PPT adversary A, there exists a PPT extractor E
such that for any polynomial b, security parameter n ∈ N, and z ∈ {0, 1}b(n),
Pr
e←KF (1n)
[ ∃x : fe(x) = y
RFe (fe(x), x′) 6= 1
∣∣∣∣ y ← A(e; z)x′ ← E(e; z)
]
≤ negl(n) .
We further say that the function is
• Publicly verifiable if there exists a polynomial-time tester T such that for any
(x, x′, e),
RFe (fe(x), x′) = T (e, fe(x), x′) ;
• Privately verifiable if there exists a polynomial-time tester T such that for
any (x, x′, e),
RFe (fe(x), x′) = T (e, x, x′) .
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Bounded auxiliary input. The case of b-bounded auxiliary-input GEOWFs is de-
fined analogously to b-bounded auxiliary-input-EOWFs. That is, RF -hardness is de-
fined exactly as in Definition 6, whereas RF -hardness is only against adversaries with
auxiliary input of an a priori fixed polynomial size b(n).
Remark 3 (doesRF -hardness imply one-wayness). In principle,RF -hardness may
not imply one-wayness of F . Although this is not needed for our purposes, we may
further require that the relation RF include all pairs (fe(x), x) and thus ensure that
RF -hardness does imply one-wayness.
Remark 4 (GEOWFs versus proximity EOWFs). In [BCCT12], a different vari-
ant of EOWFs called proximity EOWFs is defined. There a proximity relation ∼ is
defined on the range of the function. One-wayness is strengthened to require that
not only is inverting fe(x) hard, but also finding x
′ such that fe(x) ∼ fe(x′) is hard.
Extractability is weakened so that the extractor is allowed to output x′ as above,
rather than an actual preimage. GEOWFs simply allow the relation to be even more
general. In particular, any proximity EOWF with relation ∼ implies a GEOWF with
relation R, such that R(fe(x), x′) = 1 iff fe(x) ∼ fe(x′). Thus, the limitations we
show in section 4 on GEOWFs apply to proximity EOWFs as well.
4. From IO to impossibility of unbounded-auxiliary-input EOWFs. We
show that if there exists IO, there do not exist (generalized) auxiliary-input EOWFs.
We start by defining IO and puncturable PRFs.
4.1. Indistinguishability obfuscation. IO was introduced in [BGI+01] and
given a first candidate construction in [GGH+13b].
Definition 7 (indistinguishability obfuscation [BGI+01]). A PPT algorithm
iO is said to be an indistinguishability obfuscator INDO for a class of circuits C if it
satisfies the following:
1. Functionality: For any C ∈ C,
Pr
iO
[∀x : iO(C)(x) = C(x)] = 1 .
2. Indistinguishability: For any class of circuit pairs {(C(1)n , C(2)n ) ∈ C × C}n∈N,
where the two circuits (C
(1)
n , C
(2)
n ) in each pair are of the same polynomial
size s(n) = nO(1) and functionality, it holds that{
iO(C(1)n )
}
n∈N
≈c
{
iO(C(2)n )
}
n∈N
.
4.2. Puncturable PRFs. We next define puncturable PRFs. We consider a
simple case of the puncturable PRFs where any PRF might be punctured at a single
point. The definition is formulated as in [SW14] and, as shown in [BGI14, BW13,
KPTZ13], is achieved by the GGM [GGM86] PRF.
Definition 8 (puncturable PRFs). Let `,m be polynomially bounded length
functions. An efficiently computable family of functions
PRF =
{
PRFk : {0, 1}m(n) → {0, 1}`(n)
∣∣∣ k ∈ {0, 1}n, n ∈ N} ,
associated with an efficient (probabilistic) key sampler KPRF , is a puncturable PRF
if there exists a polynomial-time puncturing algorithm Punc that takes as input a key
k ∈ {0, 1}n and a point x∗ and outputs a punctured key kx∗ , so that the following
conditions are satisfied:
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ON THE EXISTENCE OF EXTRACTABLE ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS 1925
1. Functionality is preserved under puncturing: For every x∗ ∈ {0, 1}`(n),
Pr
k←KPRF (1n)
[∀x 6= x∗ : PRFk(x) = PRFkx∗ (x) | kx∗ = Punc(k, x∗)] = 1 .
2. Indistinguishability at punctured points: The following ensembles are com-
putationally indistinguishable:
• {x∗, kx∗ ,PRFk(x∗) | k ← KPRF (1n), kx∗ = Punc(k, x∗)}x∗∈{0,1}m(n),n∈N ,
• {x∗, kx∗, u |k ← KPRF (1n),kx∗=Punc(k, x∗), u←{0, 1}`(n)
}
x∗∈{0,1}m(n),n∈N.
To be explicit, we include x∗ in the distribution; throughout, we shall assume for
simplicity that a punctured key kx∗ includes x
∗ in the clear.
4.3. The impossibility result. We now show that if indistinguishability ob-
fuscators exist, there do not exist auxiliary-input EOWFs or GEOWFs according to
Definitions 4 and 6.
Theorem 9. Assuming IO for all circuits, neither EOWFs nor GEOWFs exist,
with respect to common auxiliary input of unbounded polynomial length.
Before proving the theorem we make two remarks.
Remark 5 (implications for other extractable primitives). GEOWFs are a mini-
mal extractable cryptographic primitive in the sense that other extractable primitives
such as ECRHs or succinct noninteractive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs) im-
ply them. (For example, in [BCCT12], it is shown that SNARKs imply proximity
ECRHs, which in turn imply proximity EOWFs, which as noted in Remark 4 imply
GEOWFs.) These implications are invariant with respect to auxiliary input, and thus
our limitation on common auxiliary input also holds with respect to these extractable
primitives.
Remark 6 (auxiliary-input notions that are not ruled out). The limitation we
prove relies critically on the adversary and extractor having common auxiliary input
and does not apply if we only require extractability with respect to individual auxil-
iary input, as defined in Remark 2. The result does hold if we allow both individual
and common auxiliary input. Also, our result does not apply for any distribution on
common auxiliary inputs but rather shows that some specific auxiliary-input distri-
bution fails extractability. In particular, we do not rule out natural distributions that
may be conjectured to be “benign” (see Remark 2), such as the uniform distribution.
We now turn to prove Theorem 9. To prove the theorem, for any EOWF (respec-
tively, GEOWF) family F , we shall describe an adversary A and a distribution Z
on auxiliary inputs, such that any extractor fails relative to auxiliary inputs sampled
from Z. For simplicity of exposition, we first concentrate on the case of plain EOWFs
and then show how it directly extends to the case of GEOWFs.
4.3.1. The universal adversary. We consider a universal PPT adversary A
that given (e, z) ∈ {0, 1}m(n) × {0, 1}poly(n) parses z as a circuit and returns z(e).
4.3.2. The auxiliary input distribution. Let F be a family of EOWFs and
let PRF be a puncturable PRF family. We start by defining two families of circuits:
C =
{
Ck : {0, 1}m(n) → {0, 1}`′(n)
∣∣∣ k ∈ {0, 1}n, n ∈ N} ,
C∗ =
{
Cke∗ ,y∗ : {0, 1}m(n) → {0, 1}`
′(n)
∣∣∣ k ∈ {0, 1}n, e∗ ∈ {0, 1}m(n),
y∗ ∈ {0, 1}`′ , n ∈ N
}
.
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Ck
Hardwired: a PRF key k ∈ {0, 1}n.
Input: an EOWF key e ∈ {0, 1}m(n).
1. Compute x = PRFk(e).
2. Return y = fe(x).
Fig. 1. The circuit Ck.
Cke∗ ,y∗
Hardwired: a punctured PRF key ke∗ = Punc(k, e
∗) and y∗ ∈ {0, 1}`′(n).
Input: an EOWF key e ∈ {0, 1}m(n).
1. If e 6= e∗, compute x = PRFke∗ (e), and return y = fe(x).
2. If e = e∗, return y∗.
Fig. 2. The circuit Cke∗ ,y∗ .
Zn
1. Sample k ← KPRF (1n).
2. Sample an obfuscation z ← iO([Ck]s).
3. Output z.
Fig. 3. The auxiliary input distribution Zn.
Any circuit Ck, given a key e for an EOWF, applies PRFk to e, obtains an input
x, and returns the result of applying the EOWF fe to x. The circuit is formally
described in Figure 1.
The circuit Cke∗ ,y∗ has a hardwired PRF key ke∗ that was derived from k by
puncturing it at the point e∗. In addition, it has hardwired an output y∗ to replace
the punctured result. In particular, when y∗ = fe∗(PRFk(e∗)) the circuit Cke∗ ,y∗
computes the same function as Ck. The circuit is formally described in Figure 2.
We are now ready to define our auxiliary-input distribution Z = {Zn}n∈N. Let
s = s(n) be the maximal size of circuits in either C or C∗, corresponding to security
parameter n, and denote by [C]s a circuit C padded with zeros to size s. Let iO be an
indistinguishability obfuscator. The distribution Zn simply consists of an obfuscated
(padded) circuit Ck. The distribution is formally defined in Figure 3.
4.3.3. Adversary A does not have an extractor. We next show that A
cannot have any extractor E satisfying Definition 4. In fact, we show a stronger
claim, namely, that for the auxiliary input distribution Z, any extractor fails with
overwhelming probability.
Proposition 10. Let E be any PPT candidate extractor for A; then
Pr
e←KF (1n)
z←Zn
[ ∃x : fe(x) = y
fe(x
′) 6= y
∣∣∣∣ y ← A(e; z)x′ ← E(e; z)
]
≥ 1− negl(n) .
We note that since the key e is sampled above independently of the auxiliary
input z, the above indeed disproves extractability.
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Proof of Proposition 10. First, we note that
Pr
e←KF (1n)
z←Zn
[
y ← A(e; z)
∃x : fe(x) = y
]
= 1 ;
indeed, by the definition of A and Zn, and the correctness of iO,
A(e, z) = z(e) = Ck(e) = fe(PRFk(e)) ,
where Ck ∈ C is the circuit obfuscated in z, i.e., z = iO([Ck]s).
Now, assume toward contradiction that, for infinitely many n ∈ N, the extractor
E successfully outputs a preimage with noticeable probability ε(n), i.e.,
Pr
e←KF (1n)
z←Zn
[
x′ ← E(e; z)
fe(x
′) = z(e) = fe(PRFk(e))
]
≥ ε(n) ,
where as before, z = iO([Ck]s).
Then, for every e∗ we consider an alternative distribution Zn(e∗, y∗) that instead
of sampling a circuit Ck samples a circuit Cke∗ ,y∗ , by first sampling k as usual, and
then computing y∗ = fe∗(PRFk(e∗)), and the punctured key ke∗ . (Note that Zn(e∗, y∗)
is actually only parameterized by e∗; we add y∗ to the notation to be more explicit.)
We claim that the extractor still succeeds in finding a preimage, i.e.,
Pr
e∗←KF (1n)
z∗←Zn(e∗,y∗)
[
x′ ← E(e∗; z∗)
fe∗(x
′) = z∗(e∗) = y∗ = fe∗(PRFk(e∗))
]
≥ ε(n)− negl(n) .
This follows from the iO indistinguishability guarantee, since for any e∗ and k, Ck
and Cke∗ ,y∗ compute the same function.
Next, we consider another experiment where Zn(e
∗, y∗) is altered to a new dis-
tribution Zn(e
∗, r) that, instead of sampling y∗ = fe∗(PRFk(e∗)) in Cke∗ ,y∗ , samples
y∗ = fe∗(r), for an independent random r ← {0, 1}`. We claim that
Pr
e∗←KF (1n)
z∗←Zn(e∗,r)
[
x′ ← E(e∗; z∗)
fe∗(x
′) = z∗(e∗) = y∗ = fe∗(r)
]
≥ ε(n)− negl(n) ;
indeed, this follows from the fact that PRFk(e
∗) is pseudorandom, even given the
punctured key ke∗ (as guaranteed by Definition 8).
To complete the proof, we deduce that E can be used to break the one-wayness of
F . Indeed, given a random key e∗, and a challenge y∗ = fe∗(r), an inverter can simply
sample a punctured ke∗ on its own, construct the circuit Cke∗ ,y∗ , with its challenge y
∗
hardwired in, and sample an obfuscation z∗ ← iO(Cke∗ ,y∗). Finally, it runs E(e∗, z∗)
to invert y∗, with the same probability ε(n)− negl(n).
Extending the result to GEOWFs. The result directly extends to show that no F
can even be a GEOWF with respect to auxiliary input and any relation RF . Con-
cretely, we would consider the exact same universal adversary and auxiliary-input dis-
tribution Z. The proof goes along the same lines: instead of an extractor that finds
a preimage x of y = z(e), we start from an extractor that finds x ∈ RFe (y). Then, in-
stead of obtaining an inverter that breaks the one-wayness of F , we obtain an inverter
that breaks the RF -hardness of F . The proof follows the exact same arguments. The
only thing that should be noted is that when invoking the indistinguishability given
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by iO, in the first hybrid, and then the indistinguishability given by pseudorandom-
ness at punctured points, in the second, it can indeed be efficiently tested whether
the extractor successfully obtained a witness x ∈ RFe (y). This is clear in the case that
RF is publicly verifiable and is also true in the case that it is privately verifiable, as in
both cases y is computed directly from a pre image (PRFk(e
∗), in the first, and r, in
the second) that is known to the distinguisher, and which allows testing the relation.
Finally, to deduce Theorem 9, we note that puncturable PRFs can be constructed
from one-way functions. Furthermore, EOWF is already an OWF, and any GEOWF
with RF -hardness implies that NP 6= coRP, which in conjunction with iO implies
OWFs [KMN+14]. Thus, the impossibility of auxiliary-input EOWFs and GEOWFs
is implied by IO without any further assumptions.
5. Bounded-auxiliary-input extractable one-way functions. In this sec-
tion, we construct bounded-auxiliary-input EOWFs and GEOWFs. Before presenting
the construction, we define universal delegation for deterministic computations, which
is the main tool we rely on. The notion we consider is a slight enhancement of standard
delegation schemes in the spirit of Barak and Goldreich’s [BG08] universal arguments
for nondeterministic computations. We show how to instantiate this notion based
on the delegation scheme of Kalai, Raz, and Rothblum [KRR14], which follows the
standard notion of delegation.
5.1. Universal delegation for deterministic computations. In what fol-
lows, we denote by LU the universal language consisting of all tuples (M, x, t) such
that M accepts x within t steps. We denote by LU (T ) all pairs (M, x) such that
(M, x, T ) ∈ LU .
Let T (n) ∈ (2ω(logn), 2poly(n)) be a computable superpolynomial function. A
universal delegation system for Dtime(T ) consists of three algorithms (G,P,V) that
work as follows:
• The (probabilistic) generator G, given a security parameter 1n, outputs a
reference string σ and a corresponding verification state τ ; in particular, G is
independent of any statement to be proven later.
• The honest prover P (M, x;σ) produces a certificate pi for the fact that (M,
x) ∈ LU (T (n)).
• The verifier V (M, x;pi, τ) verifies the validity of pi.
Formally, a universal delegation system is defined as follows.
Definition 11 (universal delegation). A triple (G,P,V) is a noninteractive
universal argument system for for Dtime(T ) if it satisfies the following:
1. Perfect completeness: For any n ∈ N and (M, x) ∈ LU (T (n)),
Pr
[
V (M, x;pi, τ) = 1
∣∣∣∣ (σ, τ)← G(1n)pi ← P (M, x;σ)
]
= 1 .
2. Adaptive soundness for a bounded number of statements: There is a polyno-
mial b such that for any polynomial-size prover P∗, n ∈ N, and set of at most
2b(n) false statements S ⊆ {0, 1}poly(n) \ LU (T (n)),
Pr
V(M, x;pi, τ) = 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(σ, τ)← G(1n)
(M, x, pi)← P∗(σ)
(M, x) ∈ S
 ≤ negl(n) .
3. Fast verification and relative prover efficiency: There exists a polynomial p
such that for every n ∈ N, t ≤ T (n), and (M, x) ∈ LU (t),
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• the generator G runs in time p(n);
• the verifier V runs in time p(n+ |M|+ |x|);
• the prover P runs in time p(n+ |M|+ |x|+ t).
The system is said to be publicly verifiable if soundness is maintained when the mali-
cious prover is also given the verification state τ . In this case, we will assume w.l.o.g.
that the verification state τ appears in the clear in the reference string σ.
Existence and connection to standard delegation of computation. There are two
differences between the standard notion of delegation for deterministic computations
(see, e.g., [KRR14]) and the universal delegation notion defined above:
1. A delegation system is associated with a given language L(M) for a fixed de-
terministic machine M, and the corresponding efficiency parameters depend
on the worst-case running time TM of M. In particular, the generator G de-
pends on TM as an extra parameter, and the prover’s efficiency is polynomial
in the worst-case running time TM.
2. In basic delegation schemes only nonadaptive soundness is guaranteed; in
particular, the generator’s message σ may, in principle, depend on the input x.
Kalai, Raz, and Rothblum [KRR14] show how to construct such a privately verifi-
able delegation scheme for every language in Dtime(T ) ⊆ EXP, assuming
subexponentially secure private information retrieval schemes, which can in turn be
constructed based on the subexponential learning with errors assumption [BV11].
In order to get a (privately verifiable) universal delegation for Dtime(T ), we could
potentially use their result with respect to a universal machine and worst-case running
time O(T ). However, this solution would lack the required prover efficiency, as the
prover will always run in time poly(T ), even for machines M with running time
tM << T . This is undesired in our case, as we will be interested in T that is super-
polynomial. Fortunately, a rather standard transformation does allow us to get the
required efficiency from their result. Specifically, we could run the generator in their
solution to generate a reference string and verification state (σ, τ) for computations
of size t ∀ t ∈ {1, 2, 22, . . . , 2log T}, and have the prover and verifier use the right
(σ, τ) according to the concrete running time tM < T , guaranteeing that the prover’s
running time is at most poly(2tM) as required.
As for adaptivity, in their scheme, the generator does work independently of the
input x, but only nonadaptive soundness is shown; namely, soundness is guaranteed
only when σ is generated independently of x. To guarantee soundness for adaptively
chosen inputs x from a set S of size at most 2b(n), we may repeat the above argument
O(b(n)) +n times. Assuming that the underlying delegation scheme is secure against
provers that run in time 2O(b(n)) (by choosing the security parameter in the [KRR14]
scheme appropriately), the parallel repetition exponentially reduces the soundness
error to 2−b(n)−n (see, e.g., [BIN97]). Taking a union bound over all 2b(n) adaptive
choices of x yields the required soundness. The O(b(n))-factor hit in succinctness
and verification time are still tolerable for our purposes (and still satisfy the above
definition).
Theorem 12 (follows from [KRR14]). Assuming the learning with errors prob-
lem is subexponentially hard for any b(n) = poly(n), and T (n) ∈ (2ω(logn), 2poly(n)),
there exists a (privately verifiable) universal delegation scheme with adaptive sound-
ness for 2b(n) statements.
5.2. Pseudorandom generators. We recall the definition of a cryptographic
PRG.
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Inputs: (s, r, pad) of respective lengths (n, n, `(n)− 2n).
1. Sample reference string and verification state (σ, τ) ← G(1n; r) for universal
delegation.
2. Compute v = PRG(s).
3. Output (σ, v).
Fig. 4. The function fn.
Definition 13. A polynomial-time function PRG stretching n bits to `(n) > n
bits is a PRG if its output is computationally indistinguishable from a truly random
one:
{PRG(s) | s← {0, 1}n}n∈N ≈c
{
u
∣∣∣ u← {0, 1}`(n)}
n∈N
.
5.3. Constructions. We now present our constructions of bounded-auxiliary-
input EOWFs and GEOWFs. We start with the construction of GEOWFs, based on
any universal delegation scheme. We then give a construction of the standard (rather
than generalized) EOWFs based on publicly verifiable universal delegation schemes
with an additional key validation property (satisfied by existing candidates).
5.3.1. The generalized extractable one-way function. In what follows,
• let b(n) be a polynomial,
• let PRG be a pseudorandom generator stretching n bits to b(n) + n bits,
• and let (G,P,V) be a universal delegation scheme for Dtime(T (n)) for some
function T (n) ∈ (2ω(logn), 2poly(n)), with adaptive soundness for 2b(n) state-
ments. We assume that the system handles statements of the form (M, v) ∈
{0, 1}b(n)×{0, 1}b(n)+n asserting that “M(1n) outputs v in T (n) steps.” As-
sume that G(1n; r) uses randomness of size n to output a reference string of
polynomial size m(n), and a verification state τ (if the system is publicly
verifiable, then τ appears in σ). Assume that P outputs certificates pi of size
p(n).
We construct a keyless family of functions F = {fn}n∈N, consisting of one
function fn : {0, 1}`(n) → {0, 1}`′(n), for each security parameter n, where `(n) =
max(2n, b(n) + p(n)) and `′(n) = m(n) + b(n) + n. The function is given in Figure 4
and is followed by the corresponding relation RF .
We now define the corresponding relation RF = {RFn }n∈N in Figure 5, which
will be publicly verifiable (respectively, privately verifiable) if the universal delegation
scheme is publicly (respectively, privately) verifiable. For simplicity, we assume that
the universal delegation scheme is such that for every valid reference string σ produced
by G, there is a single possible verification state τ (this can always be achieved by
adding a commitment to τ inside σ).
Claim 1. RF is publicly verifiable (respectively, privately verifiable) if (G,P,V)
is publicly verifiable (respectively, privately verifiable).
Proof. First, by definition, when (G,P,V) is publicly verifiable, τ can be obtained
from σ, verification can be done efficiently, and thus the relation RFn can be efficiently
tested given (σ, v, pi).
Next, assume that (G,P,V) is privately verifiable. Recall that showing that RFn
is privately verifiable means that given any preimage x such that y = fn(x), we can
efficiently test RFn (y, x′). Indeed, given such a preimage x = (s, r, pad), we can obtain
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Inputs:
y = fn(x) = (σ, v) of respective lengths (m(n), b(n) + n),
x′ = (M, pi, pad) of respective lengths (b(n), p(n), `(n)− b(n)− p(n)).
1. Find the (unique) verification state τ corresponding to the reference string
σ:
2. Run V(M, v;pi, τ) to verify the statement “M(1n) outputs v in T (n) steps”.
3. Return 1 iff verification passes.
Fig. 5. The relation RFn (fn(x), x′).
the generator randomness r and run G(1n; r) to obtain the (unique) verification state
τ corresponding to σ and efficiently test RFn .
Remark 7 (one-wayness versusRF -hardness of F). The relationRF defined above
is such that (fn(x), x) may not satisfy the relation. In particular, this means that
RF -hardness may not imply one-wayness of F . While this is not needed for our
purposes, the relation RF can be augmented to also include all pairs (fn(x), x), and
RF -hardness will still be preserved; that is, the function we define is one-way in the
usual sense.
We now turn to show that F is a GEOWF with respect to RF .
Theorem 14. The function family F = {fn}n∈N, given in Figure 4, is a GEOWF,
with respect to RF , against (b(n)− ω(1))-bounded auxiliary input.
High-level idea behind the proof. To see that F is RF -hard, note that to break
RF -hardness, an adversary given a random image (σ, v), where v = PRG(s) is of
length b(n) +n, has to come up with a “small” machineM, whose description length
is at most b(n), and a proof that M outputs v (within a T (n) steps). However, in
an indistinguishable world where v is a truly random string, v would almost surely
have high Kolomogorov complexity, and a short machineM that outputs v would not
exist. Thus, in this case, the breaker has to produce an accepting proof for a false
statement and violate the soundness of the universal delegation scheme.
As for extraction, given a polynomial-time machineMz with short advice z that
outputs (σ, v), where σ is a valid reference string for the universal delegation scheme,
the extractor simply computes a proof pi for the fact thatMz outputs v, and outputs
the witness (Mz, pi; pad). By the completeness of the universal delegation scheme,
the proof pi is indeed accepting, and the witness satisfies RF . Furthermore, by the
relative prover efficiency of the universal delegation scheme, the extractor runs in time
that is polynomial in the running time of the adversary Mz.
Proof of Theorem 14. We first show RF -hardness and then show RF -extract-
ability.
RF -hardness. Assume there exists a breaker B that, given y = (σ, v), where
σ ← G(1n), and v ← PRG(Un), finds x = (M, pi, pad) such that RFn (y, x) = 1
with noticeable probability ε(n). We construct a prover P∗ that breaks the adaptive
soundness of the universal delegation scheme (for 2b(n) statements), with probability
ε(n) − negl(n). P∗, given σ, first samples on its own v˜ ← Ub(n)+n (independently of
σ), and then runs B(σ, v˜) to obtain a machine M of size b(n), and a proof pi.
We first claim that with probability ε(n) − negl(n), pi is an accepting proof for
the statement (M, v˜) asserting that “M(1n) outputs v˜ in T (n) steps.” Indeed, the
view of B in the above experiment is identical to its real view, except that it gets a
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truly random v˜, rather than a pseudorandom v that was generated using PRG. Thus,
the claim follows by the PRG guarantee.
Next, we note that since v˜ is a (b(n)+n)-long random string, except with negligible
probability 2−n, there does not existM of size b(n) that outputs v˜. Thus, P∗ produces
an accepting proof for one of 2b(n) false statements given by the adaptive choice of
M∈ {0, 1}b(n) and violates the soundness of the universal delegation scheme.
RF -extractability. We now show RF -extractability. We, in fact, show that there
is one universal PPT extractor E that can handle any PPT adversaryM with advice
of size at most b(n) − ω(1). In what follows, for adversarial code M and advice
z ∈ {0, 1}b(n)−ω(1), denote by Mz the machine that, on input 1n, runs M(1n; z).
Assume that Mz has description size at most b(n) and that, on input 1n, after at
most tM < T (n) steps it outputs
Mz(1n) = y = (σ, v) ∈ Image(fn) .
The extractor E(M, z, 1tM) performs the following:
1. Constructs Mz.
2. Computes a certificate pi for the fact that “Mz(1n) = v.”
3. Outputs x′ = (Mz, pi, pad).
The fact that x′ ∈ RF (y) follows directly from the perfect completeness of the univer-
sal delegation scheme. Furthermore, by the relative prover efficiency of the universal
delegation scheme, the extractor runs in time that is polynomial in the running time
tM of the adversary.
Remark 8 (RF -hardness against superpolynomial adversaries). In section
6.4.2, we shall require GEOWFs that are RF -hard even against adversaries of size
poly(T (n)) for some superpolynomial function T (n). Such GEOWFs can be obtained
from the above construction by using a PRG that is secure against poly(T (n)) adver-
saries and a universal delegation scheme that is sound against such adversaries (such a
universal delegation scheme can be obtained from [KRR14], based on an appropriately
strong private information retrieval scheme).
5.3.2. The standard extractable one-way function. We construct a stan-
dard EOWF based on publicly verifiable universal delegation schemes that have an
additional property that says that, in addition to perfect completeness for an honestly
chosen reference string σ (which in the publicly verifiable case is also the verification
state), it is also possible to check whether any given σ is valid or more generally
admits perfect completeness. We note that existing candidates for publicly verifiable
universal delegation schemes indeed have this property.7
Definition 15 (universal delegation scheme with key validation). A publicly
verifiable universal delegation scheme is said to have key validation if there exists a
polynomial-time algorithm Valid, such that for any σ ∈ {0, 1}m(n), if Valid(σ) = 1,
then the system has perfect completeness with respect to σ. That is, proofs for true
statements, generated and verified using σ, are always accepted.
We now turn to describe the construction. At a very high level the idea behind the
construction is to embed the structure of the previous GEOWF function and relation
into a standard EOWF.
7Indeed, in Micali’s CS proofs [Mic00], perfect completeness holds with respect to all possible
keys for a hash function. In the publicly verifiable instantiations of the SNARKs from [BCCT13] it
is possible to verify the validity of σ using a bilinear map.
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ON THE EXISTENCE OF EXTRACTABLE ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS 1933
Inputs: (i, (s, r), (σ,M, v, pi)) of respective lengths (n, (n, n), (m(n), b(n), b(n) +
n, p(n)))
• If i /∈ {0n, 1n}:
1. Compute v∗ = PRG(s).
2. Sample a reference string σ∗ ← G(1n; r).
3. Output (σ∗, v∗).
• If i = 0n:
1. Perform the following tests:
– Run Valid(σ) to check the validity of σ,
– Run V(M, v;pi, σ) to verify the statement “M(1n) outputs v in
T (n) steps”,
If both accept, output (σ, v).
2. Otherwise, output ⊥.
• If i = 1n, output ⊥.
Fig. 6. The function fn.
• Let b(n) be a polynomial.
• Let PRG be a pseudorandom generator stretching n bits to b(n) + n bits.
• Let (G,P,V) be a universal delegation scheme with the same parameters as
in the above GEOWF construction and with the additional key validation
property.
We construct a keyless family of functions F = {fn}n∈N, consisting of one function
fn : {0, 1}`(n) → {0, 1}`′(n), for each security parameter n, where `(n) = 4n+ 2b(n) +
m(n) + p(n) and `′(n) = m(n) + b(n) + n. The function is given in Figure 6.
We now turn to show that F is an EOWF.
Theorem 16. The function family F = {fn}n∈N, given in Figure 6, is an EOWF,
against (b(n)− ω(1))-bounded auxiliary-input.
High-level idea behind the proof. To see that F is one-way, note that, except with
negligible probability, a random image comes from the “normal branch of the func-
tion,” where i /∈ {0n, 1n}, and includes an honestly sampled σ and a pseudorandom
string v = PRG(s). To invert it, an adversary must either invert PRG(s), allowing it to
produce a “normal branch” preimage, or obtain a short machineM and an accepting
proof pi that M outputs v, allowing it to produce a “trapdoor branch” preimage. In
the first case, the inverter violates the one-wayness of PRG. In the second case, the
inverter can be used to break the soundness of the universal delegation scheme as in
the proof of Theorem 14 (leveraging the fact that a truly random v˜ almost surely
cannot be computed by a short machine).
As for extraction, given a polynomial-time machineMz with short advice z that
outputs (σ, v) 6= ⊥, by the definition of fn, σ is a valid reference string for the universal
delegation scheme (indeed, ⊥ is an image that indicates an improper reference string
σ, or a nonaccepting proof pi). In this case, the extractor simply computes a proof pi
for the fact thatMz outputs v, and outputs the preimage (0n, (0n, 0n), (σ,Mz, v, pi)).
By the completeness of the universal delegation scheme, for a valid σ, the proof pi is
indeed accepting. By the relative prover efficiency of the universal delegation scheme,
the extractor runs in time that is polynomial in the running time of the adversary
Mz. The only other case to consider is whereMz outputs ⊥, in which case producing
a preimage is easily done by setting i = 1n.
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Proof of Theorem 16. We first show one-wayness and then show extractability.
One-wayness. Assume there exists an inverter I that, given y = fn(x), where x←
U`(n), finds a preimage x
′ = (i′, (s′, r′), (σ′,M′, v′, pi′)) with noticeable probability
ε(n). We construct a prover P∗ that breaks the adaptive soundness of the universal
delegation scheme (for 2b(n) statements), with probability ε(n)−negl(n). P∗ is defined
as in the proof of Theorem 14: given σ, it first samples on its own v˜ ← Ub(n)+n
(independently of σ), and then runs I(σ, v˜) to obtain x′ = (i′, (s′, r′), (σ′,M′, v′, pi′)).
Claim 2. With probability ε(n) − negl(n), pi′ is an accepting proof, with respect
to σ, for the statement (M′, v), attesting that “M′(1n) outputs v˜ in T (n) steps.”
The claim will conclude the proof of one-wayness. Indeed, as in the proof of
Theorem 14, except with negligible probability, there does not exist a machine M′
of size b(n) that outputs v˜, which is a (b(n) + n)-long random string. This means
that I outputs an accepting proof for one of 2b(n) false statements (given different
M′ ∈ {0, 1}b(n)) and violates the soundness of the universal delegation scheme.
Proof of Claim 2. To prove the claim, we first consider a hybrid experiment where
I samples a pseudorandom v ← PRG(Un) instead of a truly random v˜. By the
PRG guarantee, we know that the probability of outputting (M′, pi) as required by
the claim changes at most by a neglible amount negl(n). Next, we note that the
view of I in the hybrid experiment is identical to its view in the real world where
it receives a random image y = (σ, v). Furthermore, whenever I finds a preimage
x′ = (i′, (s′, r′), (σ′,M′, v′, pi′)) of y such that i′ = 0n, by the definition of fn, (σ′, v′) =
(σ, v), and pi′ must be an accepting proof for the statement (M′, v′ = v), with respect
to σ′ = σ.
Since we know that I inverts the function with probability ε(n), it thus suffices to
show that the preimage it finds is such that i = 0n, except with negligible probability.
Indeed, whenever I finds a preimage such that i′ /∈ {0n, 1n}, by the definition of fn,
it inverts v = PRG(s), contradicting the one-wayness of PRG. Also, a preimage of
(σ, v) cannot have i′ = 1n, assuming (σ, v) 6= ⊥, which is the case with overwhelming
probability. This concludes the proof of the claim.
Extractability. We show that there is one universal PPT extractor E that can
handle any PPT adversary M with advice of size at most b(n) − ω(1). The proof
is similar to the extractability proof of Theorem 14. In what follows, for adversarial
codeM and advice z ∈ {0, 1}b(n)−ω(1), denote byMz the machine that, on input 1n,
runsM(1n; z). Assume thatMz has description size at most b(n) and that, on input
1n, after at most tM < T (n) steps it outputs
Mz(1n) = y = (σ, v) ∈ Image(fn) .
The extractor E(M, z, 1tM) performs the following:
1. It computes (σ, v) =Mz(1n).
2. If (σ, v) 6= ⊥, the extractor
(a) constructs Mz,
(b) computes a certificate pi for the fact that “Mz(1n) = v,”
(c) outputs x′ = (0n, (0n, 0n), (σ,Mz, v, pi)).
3. If (σ, v) = ⊥, the extractor outputs x′ = (1n, (0n, 0n), (0m(n), 0b(n), 0b(n)+n,
0p(n))).
If (σ, v) 6= ⊥, we know that σ must be valid. In this case, the extractor’s output
x′ = (0n, (0n, 0n), (σ,Mz, v, pi)) is a valid preimage due to the perfect completeness
of the universal delegation scheme.
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ON THE EXISTENCE OF EXTRACTABLE ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS 1935
If (σ, v) = ⊥, the extractor’s output x′ = (1n, (0n, 0n), (0m(n), 0b(n), 0b(n)+n, 0p(n)))
is a preimage by definition.
Finally, we note that by the relative prover efficiency of the universal delegation
scheme, the extractor runs in time that is polynomial in the running time tM of the
adversary .
6. 2-Message and 3-message ZK against bounded-auxiliary-input veri-
fiers. In this section, we define and construct 2- and 3-message ZK arguments against
verifiers with bounded auxiliary input, based on GEOWFs. We start by presenting
the definition of such ZK arguments and two tools which will be of use. Then, we
move on to describe our constructions.
6.1. Definition. The standard definition of ZK [GMR89, Gol04] considers ad-
versarial verifiers with nonuniform auxiliary input of arbitrary polynomial size. We
consider a relaxed notion of ZK against verifiers that have bounded nonuniform advice
but arbitrary polynomial running time. This relaxed notion, in particular, includes
ZK against uniform verifiers (sometimes referred to as plain ZK [BLV06]).
Concretely, we shall focus on PPT verifiers V ∗ having advice z of an a priori
bounded size b(n), and using an arbitrary polynomial number of random coins.
Definition 17. An argument system (P, V ) for an NP relation RL(ϕ,w) is ZK
against verifiers with b-bounded advice if for every PPT verifier V ∗, there exists a
PPT simulator S such that
{〈P (w), V ∗(z)〉(ϕ)} (ϕ,w)∈RL
z∈{0,1}b(|ϕ|)
≈c {S(z, ϕ)} (ϕ,w)∈RL
z∈{0,1}b(|ϕ|)
,
where computational indistinguishability is with respect to arbitrary nonuniform
distinguishers.
Remark 9 (universal simulator). In the above definition, each PPT V ∗ is required
to have a designated PPT simulator S∗V . Our constructions will, in fact, guarantee
the existence of one universal simulator S that, in addition to (z, ϕ), is also given
the code of V ∗ and a bound 1t
∗
V on the running time of V ∗(ϕ; z), and simulates V ∗’s
view. Moreover, the running time of S is bounded by some (universal) polynomial
poly(t∗V ) in the running time of V
∗. We note that in ZK with unbounded polynomial
auxiliary input, such universality follows automatically by considering the universal
machine and auxiliary input (V ∗, 1t
∗
V ). In our context, however, this may not hold in
general since tV ∗ is unbounded and can be larger than the bound b on the size of the
advice.
6.2. WIPOK with an instance-independent first message. In this section,
we define and construct 3-message WIPOKs with a particular feature: an instance-
independent first message. We will later use these proof systems in our construction
of a 3-message ZK argument of knowledge. In such proof systems, the prover’s first
message is completely independent of the statement and witness (ϕ,w) ∈ RL to
be proven; in particular, it is of fixed polynomial size in the security parameter n,
independently of the size |ϕ,w| of the instance and witness.
Classical WIPOK protocols do not satisfy this requirement. For example, in the
classical Hamiltonicity protocol [Blu86], the first message is independent of the witness
w but does depend on the statement ϕ. In Lapidot and Shamir’s Hamiltonicity variant
[LS90], the first message is independent of (ϕ,w) themselves but does depend on |ϕ,w|
(see details in [OV12]). ZAPs, as defined by Dwork and Naor [DN07], do satisfy the
independence requirement but do not constitute a proof of knowledge.
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We show that relying on ZAPs and 3-message extractable commitments, we can
obtain a WIPOK where the first (prover) message is completely independent of (ϕ,w),
even of their length, and the second (verifier) message depends only on |ϕ|. In what
follows, we formally define WIPOK with instance-independent first message, recall
the definitions of ZAPs and extractable commitments, and then move to describe the
construction.
Definition 18 (WIPOK with instance-independent first message). Let 〈P, V 〉
be a 3-message proof system for L, with messages denoted by (wi1,wi2,wi3); we say it
is a WIPOK with instance-independent first message, if it satisfies the following:
1. Completeness with first message independence: For any ` ∈ N, ϕ ∈ L ∩
{0, 1}`, w ∈ RL(ϕ), n ∈ N,
Pr
V (ϕ,wi1,wi2,wi3; r′) = 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
wi1 ← P (1n; r)
wi2 ← V (`,wi1; r′)
wi3 ← P (ϕ,w,wi1,wi2; r)
 = 1 ,
where r, r′ ← {0, 1}poly(n) are the randomness used by P and V .
The honest prover’s first message wi1 is of length n, independently of the
length of the statement and witness (ϕ,w).
2. Adaptive witness-indistinguishability: For any deterministic polynomial-size
verifier V ∗ and all n ∈ N,
Pr
 V ∗(ϕ,wi1,wi2,wi3) = b
w0, w1 ∈ RL(ϕ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
wi1 ← P (1n; r)
ϕ,w0, w1,wi2 ← V ∗(wi1)
wi3 ← P (ϕ,wb,wi1,wi2; r)
 ≤ 1
2
+ negl(n) ,
where b← {0, 1}, r ← {0, 1}poly(n) is the randomness used by P .
3. Adaptive proof of knowledge: There is a PPT extractor E such that for any
polynomial ` = `(n), all n ∈ N, and any deterministic prover P ∗,
if Pr
 V (tr; r′) = 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
wi1 ← P ∗
wi2 ← V (`(n),wi1; r′)
ϕ,wi3 ← P ∗(wi1,wi2)
tr = (ϕ,wi1,wi2,wi3)
 ≥ ε ,
then Pr
 V (tr; r
′) = 1
w ← EP∗(11/ε, tr)
w /∈ RL(ϕ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
wi1 ← P ∗
wi2 ← V (`(n),wi1; r′)
ϕ,wi3 ← P ∗(wi1,wi2)
tr = (ϕ,wi1,wi2,wi3)
 ≤ negl(n) ,
where ϕ ∈ {0, 1}`(n), and r′ ← {0, 1}poly(n) is the randomness used by V .
Definition 19 (ZAP [DN07]). A ZAP for L is a public-coin, 2-message proof
system 〈P, V 〉, with messages denoted by (r, pi), satisfying the following:
1. Completeness: For any n ∈ N, ϕ ∈ L ∩ {0, 1}n, w ∈ RL(ϕ),
Pr
[
V (ϕ, pi; r) = 1
∣∣ pi ← P (ϕ,w, r) ] = 1 ,
where r ← {0, 1}poly(n) are the public coins of V and the probability is also
over the coins of P .
2. Witness-indistinguishability: For any deterministic polynomial-size verifier
V ∗ and all n ∈ N,
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Pr
[
V ∗(ϕ, pi) = b
w0, w1 ∈ RL(ϕ)
∣∣∣∣ ϕ,w0, w1, r ← V ∗pi ← P (ϕ,wb, r)
]
≤ 1
2
+ negl(n) ,
where b← {0, 1} and the probability is also over the randomness used by P .
3. Soundness: For any n ∈ N,
Pr
[
∃ ϕ ∈ {0, 1}
n \ L
pi ∈ {0, 1}∗
∣∣∣∣ V (ϕ, pi; r) = 1] ≤ 2−n ,
where the probability is over the public coins r ← {0, 1}poly(n).
Definition 20 (extractable commitments). A 3-message extractable commit-
ment scheme (C,R), with messages denoted by ~C = (C(1), C(2), C(3)), satisfies the
following:
1. Perfect binding: For any transcript ~C, there exists at most a single plaintext
message m such that ~C is a commitment to m (relative to some random
coins). The receiver R may abort at the end of the execution, in which case
such a message may not exist.
2. Computational hiding: For any deterministic polynomial-size receiver R∗,
{〈C(m0),R∗〉(1n)} n∈N
m0,m1∈{0,1}poly(n)
≈c {〈C(m1),R∗〉(1n)} n∈N
m0,m1∈{0,1}poly(n)
,
where 〈C(m),R∗〉(1n) denotes the transcript of an execution with plaintext
message m and security parameter n.
3. Extraction: Let ~C, ~C ′ be any two honestly generated transcripts such that they
have equal first messages C1 = C
′
1 and distinct second messages C2 6= C ′2; then
it is possible to efficiently compute a plaintext message m such that ~C, ~C ′ are
both commitments to m.
Extractable commitments as above can be constructed from any perfectly binding
noninteractive commitment (see, for example, [PW09]).
6.2.1. Construction. We now show how to use ZAPs and extractable commit-
ments to construct a WIPOK with the required properties. As mentioned above,
ZAPs already have the required independence, but they are not a proof of knowledge.
The high-level idea is to add the proof of knowledge feature to ZAPs, while main-
taining the required instance-independence. This can be done by having the prover
commit to a random string r using a 3-message extractable commitment, and then
sending, as the third message, the padded witness w⊕ r along with a ZAP proof that
it was computed correctly. While the first message is independent of (ϕ,w), it does
depend on the length |w|; this is naturally solved by committing to a seed s of fixed
length and later deriving r using a PRG.
Intuitively, extraction of the witness is now possible by extracting r (or the seed s)
from the committing prover. To ensure WI, we use the idea of turning a single witness
statement into a two-independent-witnesses statement as done in [FS90, COSV12,
BP13]. The protocol is presented in Protocol 7 (Figure 7). In it description, we abuse
notation denoting by “~C = C(m,C2)” the statement that ~C is a transcript of an
execution relative to plaintext message m and receiver message C2.
Proposition 21. Protocol 7 is a 3-message WIPOK with instance-independent
first message.
Proof. The first message is indeed taken from a fixed distribution independently
of the statement and its size. We need to show that the protocol is both WI and an
argument of knowledge. The proof is an adaptation of a proof from [BP13].
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
03
/2
7/
17
 to
 1
8.
51
.1
.6
3.
 R
ed
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
su
bje
ct 
to 
SIA
M 
lic
en
se 
or 
co
py
rig
ht;
 se
e h
ttp
://w
ww
.si
am
.or
g/j
ou
rna
ls/
ojs
a.p
hp
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © by SIAM. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited. 
1938 N. BITANSKY, R. CANETTI, O. PANETH, AND A. ROSEN
Protocol 7
Common Input: security parameter n, and ϕ ∈ L ∩ {0, 1}`.
Auxiliary Input to P : w ∈ RL(ϕ).
1. P samples seeds s0, s1 ← {0, 1}
√
n, and a bit b ← {0, 1},
and sends the first commitment message to each of the three
(C
(1)
0 , C
(1)
1 , C
(1)) ← (C(s0;u0), C(s1;u1), C(b, u)), where |(C(1)0 , C(1)1 , C(1))| =
n, where (u0, u1, u) ← {0, 1}poly(n) are the random coins used by the com-
mitter algorithm.a
2. V , given the length of the statement ` = |ϕ|, samples randomness
r ← {0, 1}poly(`) for a ZAP, and receiver messages (C(2)0 , C(2)1 , C(2)) ←
(R(C(1)0 ),R(C(1)1 ),R(C(1))), and sends (r, C(2)0 , C(2)1 , C(2)) to P .
3. P , given (ϕ,w):
• computes the third committer messages
(C
(3)
0 , C
(3)
1 , C
(3))← (C(s0, C(2)0 ;u0), C(s1, C(2)1 ;u1), C(b, C(2);u)),
• computes a0 = w ⊕ PRG(s0), a1 = w ⊕ PRG(s1),
• computes a ZAP proof pi for the statement:{~C = C(0, C(2))} ∨

~C0 = C(s0, C(2)0 )
a0 = w0 ⊕ PRG(s0)
w0 ∈ RL(ϕ)

∧{~C = C(1, C(2))} ∨

~C1 = C(s1, C(2)1 )
a1 = w1 ⊕ PRG(s1)
w1 ∈ RL(ϕ)

 ;
using the witness ((s0, w), (s1, w)),
• sends C(3)0 , C(3)1 , C(3), a0, a1, pi.
4. V verifies the ZAP proof pi, the validity of the commitments transcripts, and
decides whether to accept accordingly.
aThe commitment to b does not have to be extractable; however, we use the same com-
mitment scheme to avoid extra notation.
Fig. 7. A 3-message WIPOK with instance-independent first message
Witness-indistinguishability. We now show that the protocol is WI. Let
(ϕ¯, w¯0, w¯1) = {(ϕ,w0, w1) : (ϕ,w0), (ϕ,w1) ∈ RL}
be any infinite sequence of instances in L and corresponding witness pairs. We con-
sider a sequence of hybrids starting with a hybrid describing an interaction with a
prover that uses w0 ∈ w¯0, and ending with a hybrid describing an interaction with
a prover that uses w1 ∈ w¯1, where both w0, w1 are witnesses for some ϕ ∈ ϕ¯. We
shall prove that no efficient verifier can distinguish between any two hybrids in the
sequence.
The hybrids are summarized in Table 1. We think of the hybrids as two symmetric
sequences: one, 0.1-6, starts from witness w0, and the other, 1.1-6, starts at witness
w1. We will show that within these sequences the hybrids are indistinguishable, and
then we will show that 0.6 is indistinguishable from 1.6.
Hybrid 0.1. This hybrid describes a true interaction of a malicious verifier V ∗ with
an honest prover P that uses w0 as a witness for the statement x ∈ L. In particular,
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Table 1
The sequence of hybrids. The bit b corresponds to the bit commitment ~C. The gray cells indicate
the difference from the previous hybrid.
hyb zapwb
~Cb rb ab ⊕ rb zapw1−b ~C1−b r1−b a1−b ⊕ r1−b
0.1 (sb, w0) sb PRGb(sb) w0 (s1−b, w0) s1−b PRG(s1−b) w0
0.2 b sb PRGb(sb) w0 (s1−b, w0) s1−b PRG(s1−b) w0
0.3 b 0|sb| PRGb(sb) w0 (s1−b, w0) s1−b PRG(s1−b) w0
0.4 b 0|sb| u w0 (s1−b, w0) s1−b PRG(s1−b) w0
0.5 b 0|sb| u w1 (s1−b, w0) s1−b PRG(s1−b) w0
0.6 (sb, w1) sb PRGb(sb) w1 (s1−b, w0) s1−b PRG(s1−b) w0
1.6 (sb, w0) sb PRGb(sb) w0 (s1−b, w1) s1−b PRG(s1−b) w1
1.2-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1 (sb, w1) sb PRGb(sb) w1 (s1−b, w1) s1−b PRG(s1−b) w1
the ZAP proof is given using the witness ((s0, w0), (s1, w0)).
8 In Table 1, the witness
used in part 0 of the ZAP is referred to as zapw0, and the one corresponding to 1 is
zapw1.
Hybrid 0.2. This hybrid differs from the previous one only in the witness used in
the ZAP. Specifically, for the bit b given by ~C, the witness for the ZAP is set to be
(b, (s1−b, w0)), instead of ((sb, w0), (s1−b, w0)).9 Since the ZAP is WI, this hybrid is
computationally indistinguishable from the previous one.
Hybrid 0.3. In this hybrid, the commitment ~Cb is for the plaintext 0
|sb|, instead of
the plaintext sb. This hybrid is computationally indistinguishable from the previous
one due to the computational hiding of the commitment scheme ~C.
Hybrid 0.4. In this hybrid, instead of padding with PRG(sb), padding is done with
a random independent string rb ← {0, 1}|PRG(sb)|. Computational indistinguishability
of this hybrid and the previous one follows from the pseudorandomness of the PRG.
Hybrid 0.5. In this hybrid, the padded value ab is taken to be w1 ⊕ rb, instead of
w0 ⊕ rb. Since rb is now uniform and independent of all other elements, this hybrid
induces the exact same distribution as the previous hybrid.
Hybrid 0.6. This hybrid now backtracks, returning to the same experiment as
in Hybrid 0.1 with the exception that the ZAP witness is now ((sb, w1), (s1−b, w0))
instead of ((sb, w0), (s1−b, w0)). This indistinguishability follows exactly as when mov-
ing from 0.1 to 0.5 (only backward).
Hybrids 1.1 to 1.6. These hybrids are symmetric to the above hybrids, only they
start from w1 instead of w0. This means that they end in 1.6, which uses a ZAP
witness ((sb, w0), (s1−b, w1)), which is the same as 0.6, only in reverse order.
Hybrids 0.6 and 1.6 are computationally indistinguishable. This follows directly
from the computational hiding of the commitment ~C to b. Indeed, assume toward
contradiction that V distinguishes the two hybrids. Concretely, denote the probability
it outputs 1 on 0.6 by p0 and the probability it outputs 1 on 1.6 by p1, and assume
w.l.o.g. that p0−p1 ≥ ε(n) for some noticeable ε(n). We can construct a predictor that
given a commitment ~C = C(b) to a random bit b← {0, 1} guesses b with probability
1+ε(n)
2 . The predictor samples a random b
′ ← {0, 1} as a candidate guess for b, and
performs the experiment corresponding to 0.6 only it locates w0 and w1 according to
8Formally, the witness also includes the randomness for the commitments ~C0 and ~C1, but for
notational brevity, we shall omit it.
9Again the witness should include the randomness for the commitment ~C, and ~C1−b, but this is
omitted from our notation.
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b′, rather than the unknown b. If the distinguisher outputs 1, the predictor guesses
b = b′, and otherwise it guesses b = 1− b′.
Conditioned on b = b′, V is experiencing 0.6, and thus the guess will be correct
with probability p0; conditioned on b = 1 − b′, V is experiencing 1.6, and the guess
will be right with probability 1−p1. So overall the guessing probability is p02 + 1−p12 ≥
1
2 +
ε(n)
2 .
This completes the proof that the protocol is WI.
Argument of knowledge. We show that the protocol is an argument of knowledge.
Indeed, let P ∗ be any prover that convinces the honest verifier of accepting with
noticeable probability ε(n); then with probability at least ε(n)/2 over its first message,
it holds with probability at least ε(n)/2 over the rest of the protocol that P ∗ convinces
V . Let us call such a prefix (namely, first message) good. Now, for any good prefix,
we can consider the perfectly binding induced commitment to the bit b, and from the
soundness of the ZAP, we get a circuit that with probability at least ε(n)/2−negl(n)
produces an accepting commitment transcript for the plaintext s1−b and gives a valid
witness w ∈ RL, padded with PRG(s1−b). This in particular means that we can
first sample a prefix (hope it is good), and then use the extraction guarantee of the
commitment to learn s1−b and PRG(s1−b), and thus also the witness w.
This completes the proof of Proposition 21.
2-message WI with instance-independent first message. We shall also make use
of 2-message WI with instance-independent first message. Here, there are two verifier
and prover messages. Like in the 3-message definition the verifier message does not
depend on the instance but is allowed to depend on its length. In such a protocol,
we require only soundness. ZAPs, for instance, satisfy this requirement, but we can
also do with a privately verifiable protocol rather than a ZAP. (In fact, also in the
above construction of 3-message WIPOKs with instance-independent first message,
the ZAPs can be replaced with any 2-message WI with an instance-independent first
message.)
6.3. 1-hop homomorphic Encryption. A 1-hop homomorphic encryption
scheme [GHV10] allows a pair of parties to securely evaluate a function as follows: the
first party encrypts an input, the second party homomorphically evaluates a function
on the ciphertext, and the first party decrypts the evaluation result. Such a scheme
can be instantiated based on garbled circuits and an appropriate 2-message oblivious
transfer protocol, based on either decision Diffie–Hellman or quadratic residuosity
[Yao86, GHV10, NP01, AIR01, HK12].
Definition 22. (Gen,Enc,Eval,Dec), where Gen,Eval are probabilistic and Enc,
Dec are deterministic, is a semantically secure, circuit-private, 1-hop homomorphic
encryption scheme if it satisfies the following properties:
• Perfect correctness: For any n ∈ N, x ∈ {0, 1}n and circuit C,
Pr
sk←Gen(1n)
c=Encsk(x)
Eval
[
cˆ← Eval(c, C)
Decsk(cˆ) = C(x)
]
= 1 .
• Semantic security: For any polynomial-size A, n ∈ N, and any pair of inputs
x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}n
Pr
b←{0,1}
sk←Gen(1n)
[A(Encsk(xb)) = b] < 1
2
+ negl(n) .
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• Circuit privacy: A randomized evaluation should not leak information on the
input circuit C. This should hold even for malformed ciphertexts. Formally,
let E(x) = Supp(Enc(x)) be the set of all legal encryptions of x, let En =
∪x∈{0,1}nE(x) be the set legal encryptions for strings of length n, and let Cn
be the set of all circuits on n input bits. There exists a (possibly unbounded)
simulator S1hop such that
{C,Eval(c, C)} n∈N,C∈Cn
x∈{0,1}n,c∈E(x)
≈c {C,S1hop(c, C(x), |C|)} n∈N,C∈Cn,
x∈{0,1}n,c∈E(x)
,
{C,Eval(c, C)} n∈N
C∈Cn,c/∈En
≈c {C,S1hop(c,⊥, |C|)} n∈N
C∈Cn,c/∈En
.
6.4. Constructions. In this section, we construct ZK protocols against veri-
fiers with bounded advice from generalized EOWFs against adversaries with bounded
auxiliary input (GEOWFs against bounded auxiliary-input adversaries). We start by
describing a construction of a 3-message argument of knowledge from any GEOWF, 1-
hop homomorphic encryption, and 3-message WIPOK with instance-independent first
message. We then show a 2-message argument, assuming (noninteractive) commit-
ments that can be inverted in super-poly time T (n), GEOWFs that are hard against
poly(T (n))-size adversaries, and any 2-message WI with instance-independent verifier
message (in particular, ZAPs).
6.4.1. A 3-message ZK argument of knowledge.
Ingredients and notation.
• A semantically secure, circuit-private, 1-hop homomorphic encryption scheme
(Gen,Enc,Eval,Dec).
• A 3-message WIPOK with an instance-independent first message with mes-
sages denoted by (wi1,wi2,wi3).
• A keyless GEOWF F = {fn}n∈N, against (b(n)+2n)-bounded-auxiliary-input
adversaries, with respect to a privately verifiable relation RF ={RFn }n∈N. We denote by T the polynomial-time tester such that T (x, x′) =
RFn (fn(x), x′).
• We denote by Ty,x′(x) a circuit that, given input x, verifies that “y 6=
fn(x)” or “T (x, x′) = 1”; that is, either “x is not a valid preimage of y”
or “RFn (fn(x), x′) = 1.”
• We denote by 1 = 1y,x′ a circuit of the same size as Ty,x′ that always returns 1.
The protocol is given in Figure 8.
Theorem 23. Protocol 8 is a ZK argument of knowledge against b-bounded-
auxiliary-input verifiers.
High-level idea behind the proof. For simplicity let us explain why the protocol is
sound; showing it is an argument of knowledge follows a similar reasoning. Assuming
that ϕ /∈ L, in order to pass the WIPOK, with respect to an evaluated cipher cˆ that
decrypts to 1, the prover must know a witness x′ such that Ty,x′(x) = 1. This, by
definition, and the fact that the verifier indeed sends an image y = fn(x) together with
its encrypted preimage x, means that x′ must satisfy the relation RF (fn(x), x′) = 1,
and thus the prover violates RF -hardness. (Formally, we also need to invoke semantic
security to claim that the encryption of x does not help in producing such a witness.)
To show ZK, we rely on the fact that if the verifier sends y together with an
encryption of a true preimage x, the simulator can invoke the extractor and extract
a witness x′ from its code and auxiliary input and use it to complete the WIPOK.
Here we use the bound on the first WI prover message to claim that the overall
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Protocol 8
Common Input: ϕ ∈ L ∩ {0, 1}n.
Auxiliary Input to P : a witness w for ϕ.
1. P computes
• the first message wi1 ∈ {0, 1}n of the instance-dependent WIPOK,
and sends wi1.
2. V computes
• a random preimage x← {0, 1}`(n),
• a corresponding image y = fn(x),
• a secret key for a 1-hop homomorphic encryption sk← Gen(1n),
• an encryption cx = Encsk(x),
• the second WIPOK message wi2 for statements of size `Ψ, where `Ψ is
determined below,
and sends (y, cx,wi2).
3. P computes
• a homomorphic evaluation cˆ← Eval(1, cx),
• the third WIPOK message wi3 for statement Ψ = Ψ1(ϕ) ∨ Ψ2(y, cx, cˆ)
stating that:
{ϕ ∈ L}
∨{∃(x′, r) : cˆ = Eval(Ty,x′ , cx; r)} .
The proof is computed using the witness w ∈ RL(ϕ).
It sends (cˆ,wi3).
4. V verifies the WIPOK and that Decsk(cˆ) = 1.
Fig. 8. A 3-message ZK argument of knowledge against verifiers with b-bounded auxiliary-input.
auxiliary input is appropriately bounded. In case that the verifier diverges from the
protocol, and does not send a proper y and encrypted preimage, the definition of Ty,x′
guarantees that the circuit will also accept. Thus, in either case, the circuit privacy
of homomorphic evaluation would guarantee indistinguishability from a real proof,
where the prover actually evaluates the constant 1 circuit.
A more detailed proof follows.
Proof. We first show that the protocol is an argument of knowledge.
Proposition 24. Protocol 8 is an argument of knowledge arbitrary
polynomial-size provers.
Proof. We show that there exists a PPT extractor E such that for any polynomial-
size prover P ∗ that generates ϕn ∈ {0, 1}n and convinces V of accepting ϕn with
nonnegligible probability ε(n) = n−O(1), the extractor EP∗(1ε(n), ϕn) outputs w ∈
RL(ϕn) with probability ε(n)2/4 − negl(n).10 We start by describing the extractor
and then analyze its performance. Throughout the description (and following proof),
we will often omit n, when it is clear from the context.
The witness extractor EP∗(1ε(n), ϕn) operates as follows:
1. Derives from P ∗ a new prover P ∗wi for the WIPOK as follows. P
∗
wi emulates the
role of P ∗ in the WIPOK; in particular, it would (honestly) sample (y, cx) on
its own to compute the second verifier message (y, cx,wi2, ) that P
∗ receives.
2. Chooses the random coins r for P ∗wi and samples a transcript tr = (Ψ,wi1,wi2,
wi3) of an execution with the honest WIPOK verifier Vwi.
10The extraction probability can then be amplified to 1− negl(n) by standard repetition.
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3. Applies the WIPOK extractor Ewi on the transcript tr, with oracle access to
P ∗wi, and extraction parameter 2/ε. That is, computes w ← EP
∗
wi(r)
wi (1
2/ε, tr).
4. Outputs w.
We will show that if the extractor fails to extract with the required probability,
then we can use P ∗ to break the RF -hardness of F . Thus from here on, we assume
that for some noticeable function η(n) = n−O(1), with probability at most ε2/4 − η
the extracted witness w is in RL(ϕ). We shall first establish several claims regarding
the extraction procedure and the consequences of extraction failure. Then we will
describe the reduction to RF -hardness.
We start by noting that an execution of P ∗wi(r) with the honest WIPOK verifier
Vwi induces a perfectly emulated execution of P
∗ with the honest verifier V . Thus,
we know that V , and in particular Vwi, accept in such an execution with probability
ε(n) ≥ n−O(1).
Good coins r. We say that random coins r for P ∗wi are good if with probability at
least ε/2 over the coins of the WIPOK verifier Vwi, the induced execution of P
∗ with
V is such that the ZK verifier V accepts. By a standard averaging argument, at least
an (ε/2)-fraction of the coins r for P ∗wi are good.
Recall that every execution of Ewi induces a choice r for P ∗wi, a WIPOK transcript
tr = (Ψ,wi1,wi2,wi3), and values (y, cx, cˆ) exchanged in the induced interaction be-
tween the ZK prover P ∗ and the ZK verifier V . These values, in turn, determine the
statement
Ψ = Ψ1(ϕ) ∨Ψ2(y, cx, cˆ).
We next claim that for any good r, such an extraction procedure outputs a witness
for Ψ and simultaneously the homomorphic evaluation result cˆ decrypts to one (under
the secret key sk sampled together with cx), with nonnegligible probability.
Claim 3 (extraction for good r). For any good r for P ∗wi, it holds that w satisfies
the induced statement Ψ and Decsk(cˆ) = 1 with probability ε(n)/2 − negl(n) over a
transcript tr, and coins for Ewi.
Proof of Claim 3. Fix some good coins r. Since the coins r are good, the WIPOK
verifier Vwi is convinced by P
∗
wi with probability at least ε/2, meaning that Vwi accepts
and in addition Decsk(cˆ) = 1. We claim that when this occurs then, except with
probability negl(n), the extractor Ewi, also outputs a valid witness w for Ψ. This
follows directly from the extraction guarantee of the WIPOK.
Now, relying on the fact that overall the extractor fails to output a witness for
ϕ, we deduce that with nonnegligible probability, the extracted witness satisfies the
trapdoor statement Ψ2.
Claim 4 (extracting a trapdoor witness). In a random execution of the ex-
tractor, the extracted witness w satisfies the trapdoor statement Ψ2(y, cx, cˆ), and in
addition Decsk(cˆ) = 1, with probability at least η(n)− negl(n) over the choice of r for
P ∗wi, a transcript tr, and coins for Ewi.
Proof of Claim 4. First, by the (ε/2)-density of good r’s and Claim 3, we deduce
that in a random execution the extracted w satisfies the statement Ψ = Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2,
and in addition Decsk(cˆ) = 1, with probability at least ε
2/4 − negl(n). Combining
this with the fact that w ∈ RL(ϕ) with probability at most ε2/4 − η, the claim
follows.
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Next, recall that by the definition of Ψ2, whenever w is a witness for Ψ2, it holds
that
w = (x′, r) such that cˆ = Eval(Ty,x′ , cx; r) .
Furthermore, by the definition of Ty,x′ and the perfect correctness of the 1-hop ho-
momorphic encryption,
Decsk(cˆ) = Ty,x′(x) = T (x, x′) .
We thus deduce that, with probability η, the witness w = (x′, r) extracted by E is
such that RFn (y, x′) = 1.
An equivalent experiment that hides the secret input x. We now consider an aug-
mented extraction procedure Eaug that behaves exactly as the original extractor E ,
except that, when P ∗wi emulates P
∗, it does not sample an encryption cx of the secret
verification state x, but rather it samples an encryption c0 of 0
|x|. We claim that in
this alternative experiment, the above condition still holds with the same probability
up to a negligible difference.
Claim 5 (success probability in alternative experiment.). With probability η −
negl(n), the witness w = (x′, r) extracted by Eaug is such that RFn (y, x′) = 1.
Proof sketch of Claim 5. This claim follows from the semantic security of the 1-
hop homomorphic encryption scheme. Indeed, if the above was not the case, we can
distinguish between an encryption of x and one of 0|x|. For this, note that the first
experiment with cx (respectively, the second with c0) can be perfectly emulated given
x and the ciphertext cx (respectively, c0), and in addition the above condition can be
tested efficiently.
The reduction to RF -hardness. We are now ready to describe a reduction R that
violates RF -hardness. For this, we consider a restricted augmented extractor Ey∗aug
that unlike Eaug does not emulate the image y = fn(x) itself but uses instead y∗. The
reduction RP∗ , given a challenge y∗ = fn(x∗), invokes Ey∗,P∗aug (1ε(n), ϕn), obtains a
witness w = (x′, r), and outputs x′.
Claim 6. R finds x′ such that RFn (y∗, x′) = 1 with probability η − negl(n).
Proof. For a random challenge y∗ = fn(x∗), the experiment in which Ey∗,P∗aug (1ε(n),
ϕn) is invoked is distributed identically to that where EP∗aug(1ε(n), ϕn) (which samples
y on its own) is invoked. Thus, the claim follows from Claim 5.
This completes the proof of Proposition 24.
We next show that the protocol is ZK.
Proposition 25. Protocol 8 is ZK against any polynomial-time verifier V ∗ with
auxiliary input of size at most b(n).
Bounded randomness. We note that, since the ZK simulator is allowed to simulate
the (a priori unbounded) randomness of the verifier V ∗, we can restrict attention to
verifiers V ∗ that only have bounded randomness. Indeed, assuming the existence
of one-way functions, we can always consider a new verifier V˜ ∗ that first stretches
its bounded randomness using a PRG and then emulates V ∗ using the generated
pseudorandom string. To simulate the view of V ∗, we can first apply the simulator S˜
for V˜ ∗ and then apply the PRG on the simulated randomness to obtain a full simulated
view for V ∗. Accordingly, from here on we can simply focus on deterministic verifiers
V ∗ that get their bounded randomness as part of their bounded advice.
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Proof of Proposition 25. We describe a universal (Remark 9) ZK simulator S and
show its validity. Let ϕ ∈ L and let V ∗ be the code of any malicious verifier with
running time bounded by t(n), and let z′ be any advice of length at most b(n).
The simulator S(V ∗, 1t(n), ϕ, z′), where |ϕ| = n, operates as follows:
1. Generates the first message wi1 ∈ {0, 1}n of the WIPOK.
2. Feeds wi1 to V
∗(ϕ; z′), who returns (y, c,wi2) that are (allegedly) an image
under the function fn, an encryption of a corresponding preimage, and the
second message of the WIPOK.
3. Computes the third message (cˆ,wi3) as follows:
(a) Constructs from the code of V ∗ a machine MV ∗ that, given 1n and
z = (z′, ϕ,wi1) as input, outputs some y, and whose running time is
linear in the running time tV ∗ of V
∗.
(b) Applies the extractor E on MV ∗ to obtain a witness x′ such that
RF (y, x′) = 1.
(c) Computes cˆ = Eval(Ty,x′ , c; r) using randomness r.
(d) Computes the third WIPOK message wi3 for the statement Ψ = Ψ1(ϕ)∨
Ψ2(y, cx, cˆ) given by
{ϕ ∈ L}
∨
{∃(x′, r) : cˆ = Eval(Ty,x′ , cx; r)}
using the witness (x′, r) for the trapdoor statement Ψ2.
(e) Outputs the view (wi1, cˆ,wi3) of V
∗.
Note that |z| ≤ |z′|+|ϕ|+|wi1| ≤ b(n)+2n, and thus, if y = fn(x) for some x, applying
the extractor E on MV ∗ would result in a witness x′, such that RF (y, x′) = 1, in
time poly(t∗V ). (S does not test whether y is a valid image; it applies the extractor
regardless to obtain a candidate x′.) We now show that the view generated by S
is computationally indistinguishable from the view of V ∗ in an execution with the
honest prover P . We do this by exhibiting a sequence of hybrids.
Hybrid 1. The view (wi1, cˆ,wi3) is generated by S.
Hybrid 2. Instead of generating wi3, using the witness (x
′, r) for Ψ2, it is generated
using a witness w for Ψ1 = {ϕ ∈ L}. By the adaptive witness-indistinguishability of
the WIPOK system, this hybrid is computationally indistinguishable from Hybrid 1.
Hybrid 3. The view (wi1, cˆ,wi3) is generated in an interaction of V
∗ with the
honest prover P . The difference from Hybrid 3 is that cˆ is sampled from Eval(1, cx)
instead of Eval(Ty,x′ , cx) for the extracted input x′.
First, in case c is a well-formed ciphertext and x = Decsk(c), the circuit privacy
of the 1-hop homomorphic encryption guarantees that
Eval(Ty,x′ , cx) ≈c S1hop(cx, Ty,x′(x), |Ty,x′ |) ≡ S1hop(cx,1(x), |1|) ≈c Eval(1, cx) .
To see that indeed Ty,x′(x) = 1(x), note that if y = fn(x) the extracted x′ is such
that T (x, x′) = 1. From the definition of Ty,x′ , it follows that Ty,x′(x) = 1.
Also, for any malformed ciphertext c∗ it holds that
Eval(Ty,x′ , c∗) ≈c S1hop(c∗,⊥, |Ty,x′ |) ≡ S1hop(c∗,⊥, |1|) ≈c Eval(1, c∗).
It follows that Hybrid 3 is computationally indistinguishable from Hybrid 2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 23.
6.4.2. A 2-message ZK argument. In this section, we show that, using com-
plexity leveraging (and superpolynomial hardness assumptions), we can augment the
protocol from the previous section to a 2-message argument.
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Protocol 9
Common Input: ϕ ∈ L ∩ {0, 1}n.
Auxiliary Input to P : a witness w for ϕ.
1. V computes
• a random preimage x← {0, 1}`(n),
• a corresponding image y = fn(x),
• a secret key for a 1-hop homomorphic encryption sk← Gen(1n),
• an encryption cx = Encsk(x),
• the first WI message wi1 for statements of size `Ψ, where `Ψ is deter-
mined below,
and sends (y, cx,wi1).
2. P computes
• a commitment to zero C ← C(0`),
• a homomorphic evaluation cˆ← Eval(1, cx),
• the second WI message wi2 for statement Ψ = Ψ1(ϕ) ∨ Ψ2(y, cx, cˆ, C)
stating that:
{ϕ ∈ L}
∨{
∃(x′, r, r′) : cˆ = Eval(Ty,x′ , cx; r)
C = C(x′; r′)
}
.
The proof is computed using the witness w ∈ RL(ϕ).
It sends (C, cˆ,wi2).
3. V verifies the WI and that Decsk(cˆ) = 1.
Fig. 9. A 2-message ZK argument against verifiers with b-bounded auxiliary input.
Ingredients and notation.
• A semantically secure, circuit-private, 1-hop homomorphic encryption scheme
(Gen,Enc,Eval,Dec).
• A 2-message WI with an instance-independent first message with messages
denoted by (wi1,wi2).
• A keyless GEOWF F = {fn}n∈N, against (b(n) +n)-bounded-auxiliary-input
adversaries, with respect to a privately verifiable relation RF = {RFn }n∈N.
We denote by T the polynomial-time tester such that T (x, x′)=RFn (fn(x), x′).
Further assume that F is one-way against adversaries of size poly(T ) (see Re-
mark 8).
• A perfectly binding commitment C that is hiding against polynomial-size ad-
versaries, and can be completely inverted in time T (n), for some computable
superpolynomial function T (n) = nω(1).
• We denote by Ty,x′(x) a circuit that, given input x, verifies that “y 6=
fn(x)” or “T (x, x′) = 1”; that is, either “x is not a valid preimage of y”
or RFn (fn(x), x′) = 1.
• We denote by 1 = 1y,x′ a circuit of the same size as Ty,x′ that always returns 1.
The protocol is given in Figure 9.
Theorem 26. Protocol 9 is a ZK argument against b-bounded-auxiliary-input
verifiers.
High-level idea behind the proof. Proving ZK against verifiers with bounded ad-
vice is essentially the same as in the 3-message protocol, only now the simulator
also commits to the input that it extracts from the verifier (by the hiding of the
commitment ZK is maintained). The proof of soundness is essentially the same as
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showing proof of knowledge in the 3-message protocol, only now the WI proof does
not provide witness extraction; instead we will extract a witness in time poly(T (n))
by inverting the prover’s commitment with brute-force. Since one-wayness holds even
against poly(T (n))-adversaries, soundness follows.
The actual proof closely follows the proof of Theorem 23. We now give a proof
sketch, stressing the differences between the two.
Proof sketch. We first show that the protocol is sound against polynomial-size
adversaries.
Claim 7. Protocal 9 is an argument.
Proof sketch. Let P ∗ be any polynomial-size prover, and assume toward contra-
diction that for infinitely many ϕ /∈ L, P ∗ convinces V of accepting with noticeable
probability ε(n). We show that P ∗ can be used to break the RF -hardness of F . The
breaker, given the image y, would sample a first WI message wi1, and an encryption
of zero c0, and feed (y, c0,wi1) to P
∗, who would then output a commitment C, an
(alleged) image y, and a proof wi2 for the statement Ψ = Ψ1(ϕ)∨Ψ2(y, c0, cˆ, C). The
breaker would now invert C in time T (n) and output the result x′.
We now argue that, with probability ε(n) − negl(n), C is a commitment to a
witness x′ satisfying RFn (fn(x), x′) = 1, thus breaking the RF -hardness of F , against
poly(T (n))-time adversaries. To see this, note that by the semantic security of the
1-hop encryption, the described experiment is indistinguishable from an experiment
in which the breaker uses an encryption cx of an actual preimage x of y, as in a
real interaction between V and P ∗. Thus, as in a real interaction, with probability
ε(n) − negl(n), the WI proof computed by the breaker is convincing. Since ϕ /∈ L,
it follows by the soundness of the WI system the statement Ψ2(y, c0, cˆ, C) holds, and
thus in particular, C is a commitment to a witness x′ such that RFn (fn(x), x′) =
Ty,x′ = 1.
We next show that the protocol is ZK. As noted in the previous section, we can
restrict attention to deterministic verifiers V ∗ that get their bounded randomness as
part of their bounded advice.
Claim 8. Protocal 9 is ZK against any polynomial-time verifier V ∗ with advice
of size at most b(n).
Proof sketch. We describe a universal (Remark 9) ZK simulator S and show its
validity. Let ϕ ∈ L, let V ∗ be the code of any malicious verifier, and let z′ be any
advice of length at most b(n). S starts by running V ∗(ϕ; z′), who returns (y, c,wi1),
which are (allegedly) an image fn(x), an encryption of its preimage x, and the verifier
message of the WI protocol.
The simulator S now constructs from the code of V ∗ a machineMV ∗ that, given
1n and z = (z′, ϕ) as input, outputs some y, and whose running time is linear in the
running time tV ∗ of V
∗. In particular, |z| ≤ |z′|+ |ϕ| ≤ b(n) + n. S then applies the
extractor E on MV ∗ and obtains a candidate witness x′ ∈ {0, 1}` in time poly(t∗V ).
The simulator S now computes cˆ = Eval(Ty,x′ , c), as well as a commitment C to x′,
and computes the second WI message wi2 using the trapdoor x
′ as a witness for Ψ2.
It sends (C, cˆ,wi2) to complete the simulation.
The validity of the simulator now follows by witness-indistinguishability, as well
as the circuit privacy guarantee. Specifically, we can first move to a hybrid experi-
ment where the WI proof is given using the witness w. The view generated in this
experiment is indistinguishable from the one generated by S due to the WI guarantee.
Now, we claim that the view generated in this experiment is indistinguishable from
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that generated in a real interaction between the honest prover P and V ∗. Indeed,
there are two differences between the two. First, P commits to 0` instead of to x′,
and second, it sends cˆ ← Eval(1, c), instead of cˆ ← Eval(Ty,x′ , c), for the extracted
input x′. The two views are indistinguishable by the hiding of the commitment and
by the function privacy guarantee of the 1-hop evaluation (this is argued exactly as
in the proof of Claim 25).
This completes the proof sketch of Theorem 26.
Appendix A. Black-box barriers. In our construction of (generalized)
EOWFs against bounded-auxiliary-input adversaries, the extractor is non-black-box;
namely, it makes explicit use of the adversary’s code. In particular, the simulation
of our 2-message and 3-message ZK protocols, which invokes this extractor, makes
a non-black-box use of the adversarial verifier. In this section, we show that this
is inherent by extending known results for adversaries with unbounded polynomial
advice to the case of bounded-advice adversaries. We also observe that such black-
box impossibilities do not hold for totally uniform adversaries (having no advice at
all, on top of their constant size description).
EOWF with black-box extractors. We sketch why there do not exist EOWFs
against b-bounded auxiliary-input adversaries where b = nΩ(1), for security param-
eter n, and where the extractor only uses the adversary as a black box. Specifically,
we show that given a function family F that satisfies one-wayness, there does not
exist a PPT black box extractor E such that for any PPT adversaryM, any security
parameter n ∈ N, and any advice z ∈ {0, 1}b(n),
Pr
e←KF (1n)
[
y ←M(e; z)
∃x : fe(x) = y ∧
x′ ← EM(·;z)(e)
fe(x
′) 6= y
]
≤ negl(n) .
This essentially follows the same idea behind the impossibility presented in section 4,
only that now some of the computation done there by the obfuscated auxiliary input
can be shifted from the auxiliary input to the adversary itself, as it is anyhow accessed
as a black box. Concretely, consider the adversary M that interprets its auxiliary
input z as a seed k of a PRF that maps the keys of F to inputs of F . On input (e; z),
M computes an input x = PRFz(e) and outputs y = fe(x). A similar argument to the
one used in the proof of Theorem 9 in section 4 shows that any black-box extractor
E can be used to break the one-wayness property of F . (A similar barrier can be
derived for the case of GEOWFs.)
Note that the above certainly does not hold when b(n) = O(log(n)), since then the
advice cannot contain a seed for a secure PRF. In fact, when b(n) = O(log(n)), any
family that is EOWF against b-bounded auxiliary-input adversaries also has a black-
box extractor. The extractability property of the EOWF guarantees the existence of
an extractor for every adversary M and advice z. Since there are only polynomially
many different pairs (M, z), a black-box extractor can run the (possibly non-black-
box) extractor for every such (M, z), and it is guaranteed that one of these executions
outputs a valid preimage.
3-message ZK with black-box simulation. Goldreich and Krawczyk [GK96] show
that a 3-message protocol for a language L /∈ BPP that is ZK against nonuniform
verifiers cannot have a black-box simulator. That is, there is no simulator that only
uses the verifier as a black box. To show this, they first construct a specific family V
of nonuniform verifiers and then prove that any black-box simulator that can simulate
verifiers in V can be used to decide L efficiently. This proof, however, does not directly
rule out black-box simulation for bounded auxiliary-input verifiers. The reason is that,
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in the proof of [GK96], the advice given to verifiers in V encodes a key for a p-wise
independent hash function where p bounds the running time of the simulator. Now,
to rule out any polynomial-time simulator, we must require simulation for verifiers
with advice of arbitrary polynomial length.
However, as observed in [BGGL01, PTW11], assuming one-way functions ex-
ist, one can replace the p-wise independent hash function in the construction of V
by a PRF with seed length that is independent of p. Then, using the same ar-
gument as [GK96], one can show that black-box simulation is impossible even for
b-bounded auxiliary-input verifiers where b(n) = nΩ(1).
Similarly to the case of EOWF, there is no impossibility for 3-message ZK against
verifiers with b-bounded auxiliary input where b(n) = O(log(n)). In fact, as explained
above, in this case, the non-black-box extractor of our GEOWF also implies a black-
box extractor, which we can use to construct a black-box simulator in our 3-message
ZK protocol.
2-message ZK. Goldreich and Oren [GO94] show that 2-message protocols for any
language L /∈ BPP that are ZK against nonuniform verifiers do not exist (even with
non-black-box simulation). Their result crucially relies on the fact that the auxiliary
input of the verifier can encode the first message of the protocol (and in particular
extends to also rule out the case of bounded auxiliary-input verifiers, with advice
longer that the first message). Our construction of 2-message ZK does not contra-
dict the impossibility of [GO94] since it is only ZK against b-bounded auxiliary-input
adversaries where b is smaller than the length of the first protocol message.
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